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THE LIMITS OF QUANTITATIVE LEGAL
ANALYSES: CHAOS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
AND FDIC v. W.R. GRACE & CO.*
Royce de R. Barondes"
INTRODUCTION
Quantitative analyses may contribute unique insights into
legal issues.' Where legal rules produce unanticipated or coun-
ter-intuitive results, quantitative analyses may provide an
intellectual framework needed to understand the interaction of
the relevant factors. The benefits of a quantitative or quasi-
quantitative analysis may be particularly helpful where com-
peting forces have conflicting influences on the actors being
regulated.
Yet hazards exist in integrating theories of one discipline
into another. The elegance of a contained, well-defined theory
may suggest more grandiose applications of questionable valid-
ity.
Interdisciplinary legal scholarship, by its nature, presents
intellectual frameworks unfamiliar to a substantial portion of
* Copyright © 1995 Royce de R. Barondes. All rights reserved.
** Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
the States of New Hampshire and New York. J.D., University of Virginia
School of Law, 1985; S.M. and S.B. (Mechanical Engineering),
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982.
1. But see ROBERT C. HILBORN, CHAOS AND NONLINEAR DYNAMICS:
AN INTRODUCTION FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 58-59 (1994) (criticiz-
ing social scientists who embrace mathematical analyses consisting of (i)
selecting the most important features of phenomena being studied, (ii)
creating simple quantitative models of those features and (iii) confirming
that the models' results agree with observed actions in particular cases,
on the basis that the systems studied by social scientists are not simple
and reproducible).
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its audience. An exhaustive catalog of fallacious quantitative
constructs in legal analyses would be endless. It is therefore
impracticable to describe fully the entire pattern of erroneous
analyses. Nevertheless, it is useful to have a few rudimentary
techniques to identify quantitative or quasi-quantitative analy-
ses whose conclusions merit closer scrutiny.
This Article identifies a few of those techniques by examin-
ing a number of quasi-quantitative legal analyses that have
addressed a range of legal relationships. The methodology of
this Article consists of reviewing the relationship between
those legal analyses and their associated non-legal disciplines.
The unifying theme of the discussed examples is that a useful,
well constructed quantitative analysis or approach has been
improperly extended into a legal context.
I. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES AS A METAPHOR
A. Chaos in Jurisprudence
Dean Robert Scott recently published an essay analyzing a
"Justice Paradox" in light of chaos theory.2 Dean Scott defines
the Justice Paradox as an inherent tension between a need for
a legal system that provides for "justice between the parties to
any particular dispute" and a desire to implement legal rules
that affect future conduct in desired ways by creating appropri-
ate incentives.4 Dean Scott calls the first goal "Present Jus-
2. Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 329 (1993). That piece is not the only example of the
attempt to introduce chaos theory into legal analyses. E.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Gene-
alogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
546, 581-608 (1994); Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and
Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751 (1992); Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the
Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991). Other legal commentators have
made passing references to chaos theory. E.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The
Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications
for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV.
137, 158-60 (1991); Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealing with Anomalies,
Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the Market Securities Class
Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 123, 145-46 (1992).
3. Scott, supra note 2, at 330.
4. Id.
[Vol.48:161
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tice" and the second goal 'Future Justice."5 He asserts that
these two goals "are usually intractably opposed,"' and their
conflict results in an observable oscillation in legal rules." His
essay includes a lengthy discussion of the historical develop-
ment of competing legal doctrines, 8 which is followed by a
brief discussion of chaos theory."
The exact language of the discussion of chaos theory merits
quotation (in part):
The first lesson of the whole is the concept of dynamics: all
systems are chaotic, in the sense that they are subject to
irregularities that make predictions of outcomes in particular
cases impossible. A key premise of Chaos Theory, the butter-
fly effect, states that small changes in initial conditions have
fundamental effects on outcomes. Thus, the iftovement of the
wings of a butterfly in Bombay effects [sic] the weather pat-
terns in Williamsburg.
I suggest that we should look to Chaos Theory as a meta-
phor for the way to think about the contradictions and the
tensions inherent in the legal system .... All systems, includ-
ing the legal system, are unpredictable and erratic. ... By
explicitly applying this to law, it becomes clear that even
slight differences in the facts of cases result in wildly dispa-
rate judicial outcomes. In both instances, disorder is inevita-
ble.
5. Id.
6. Id. A similar distinction was expressed by Professor Laurence
Tribe in discussing a piece written by a disciple of law and economics:
One salient feature of Professor Easterbrook's distinction is
that concern for fairness surfaces principally in the ex post, not
the ex ante, approach. That is, if courts seek to do justice among
the parties actually before them by merely slicing up the pie
fairly, they must forfeit the opportunity to expand the pie as a
whole by formulating an appropriate forward-looking and general
legal rule. For, in Professor Easterbrook's opinion, a focus on the
equities in the individual case "almost invariably" leads to the
promulgation of rules that tend to impoverish people generally,
by snatching from them the opportunity to order their activities
more efficiently in the future.
Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REV. 592, 593 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
7. Scott, supra note 2, at 330-47.
8. Id. at 331-47.
9. Id. at 348-51.
19951 163
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.. It is not only that there is disorder in any physical sys-
tem. Rather, Chaos Theorists have also come to the conclu-
sion that chaotic (or nonlinear) processes are-because of
their unpredictability-more stable than those in equilibrium
(linear processes).
... Each pattern is similar to the past, but different in
scale. The system is dynamic. The phenomenon of patterns
formed by unpredictable and irregular human behaviors is
reality that should give us comfort in accepting the inevita-
bility of paradox in law."°
If one actually were to give credence to Dean Scott's analy-
sis, the implications would be rather disturbing. The thrust of
the discussion is that any legal system over time inevitably
will produce alternating, conflicting results. What justice is
reflected in a legal system in which "even slight differences in
the facts of cases result in wildly disparate judicial out-
comes"?"
The core of Dean Scott's analysis relies on metaphor. The
discussion does not reduce the analyzed environment to quan-
titative terms and apply an analysis to those terms; it does not
even specify the variables being considered.
Another commentator analyzing the nature of the evolution
of legal doctrines in light of chaos theory more explicitly identi-
fies the metaphorical nature of his analysis. 2 That discussion
is unsuccessful in adding formalism by postulating a few "met-
aphorical" assumptions, 3 because it does not provide coher-
ent, rational analyses of those "metaphorical" assumptions.
That commentator asserts, "In short, chaos is essential to un-
derstand law." 4 After much confusing discussion, the dis-
course concludes:
Like any complex dynamical system, the law exists in time
as well as in space and constantly evolves as it is applied to
new cases .... The natural state of the law is one of constant
10. Id. at 348-50 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 348.
12. Hayes, supra note 2.
13. Id. at 765-66.
14. Id. at 752.
164 [Vol.48:161
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turbulence as the system maintains itself in a self-organized
critical state of steady change punctuated by drastic para-
digm shifts at irregular intervals.
Lawyers are well aware of this fact of constant evolution
and periodic revolution in doctrine, but the absence of a cul-
tural metaphor for the process has made it seem unintelligi-
ble and alienating. The answer lies in the rejection of classi-
cal notions of scale and determinism.... And maddeningly
(for some), this process is non-deterministic: law is forever
making progress, but never quite arrives.
This structured disorder and endless complexity is neces-
sary and healthy, but it cannot be fully predicted or con-
trolled, since any linear projections will inevitably be over-
whelmed by the butterfly effect. 5
The author admits that this analysis is metaphorical, yet he
asserts, 'The explanatory power of this theory is not dimin-
ished by the fact that it is admittedly a metaphorical descrip-
tion of the legal system. '6
B. Examination of the Existence of a "Justice Paradox"
The fundamental premise of Dean Scott's piece, that there is
an inevitable Justice Paradox, is not free from doubt. Present
Justice and Future Justice might conflict in at least three
ways: first, the conflict might refer to some insoluble tension
between the goals of Present Justice and Future Justice; sec-
ond, the conflict might be based on considerations of retroactiv-
ity; or third, the conflict might reflect an inherent human bias
that undervalues future consequences relative to current ef-
fects. 7 In the first possible conflict, Future Justice requires
15. Id. at 767-68.
16. Id. at 765.
17. The oscillating legal doctrines described by Dean Scott might seem
to be similar to "behavioral strategies" contemplated by game theory. A
behavioral strategy is one in which the player selects one of two or more
possible plays based on a random selection. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME
THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 156 (1991); MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEO-
RY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 37-38 (1982) (using the term "behavior strat-
egy"). Where the players do not have perfect information, a player may
be best served by choosing a behavioral strategy. See id. at 37 (identify-
ing as an example a strategy for choosing hands in the traditional
method for selecting colors in chess). Nevertheless, the oscillations de-
1995] 165
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creation of an incentive system, consisting of penalties and
rewards, to encourage individuals to act in certain ways. The
conflict would arise from a desire, after the fact, not to impose
punishment on some or all individuals who nevertheless did
not act in accordance with the incentives. The "paradox" pur-
portedly would arise because withholding punishment would
then alter the incentive system. In other words, the conflict
might arise out of a desire to provide justice to a particular
litigant. Yet a decisionmaker might recognize that such a deci-
sion would result in undesirable actions by other parties in the
future.
There is no "paradox," however, in this context. Either the
value of influencing individuals' actions arising from the impo-
sition of any particular system of incentives outweighs the
costs and other disadvantages of the system of incentives,
including any distributional effects of the punishment, or the
value of the incentive system is outweighed by its costs.18 Of
course, reaching a conclusion may be very complex and may re-
quire comparing inherently distinct types of advantages and
disadvantages. And one might well wish that certain admira-
ble policies would not produce subsequent changes in the ac-
tions of members of society. Yet these problems are not "para-
doxes" in the sense of being incapable of resolution. They mere-
ly may be difficult to resolve and, as society develops, may be
subject to different resolutions at different times.
Social choice theorists have identified certain assumptions
under which group decisionmaking may not produce transitive
results (referred to as Arrow's impossibility theorem).19 Never-
theless, Dean Scott does not mention the impossibility theo-
scribed by Dean Scott do not reflect a typical behavioral strategy, be-
cause the choice of legal doctrine at any time is, to some extent, depen-
dent upon the resolution of prior litigation.
18. It is highly unlikely that the advantages of any significant incen-
tive system will be precisely equal to its disadvantages.
19. See generally DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND
ELECTIONS (1958); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-62 (1991) (discussing
Arrow's impossibility theorem); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority
Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 984-96
(1989) (discussing the intransitivity of group voting).
166 [Vol.48:161
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rem.2" Moreover, the impossibility theorem draws no distinc-
tion between "present" and "future" goals, and therefore the
theorem does not support the distinction made by Dean Scott.
The second possible meaning of the purported paradox is
that any judicial attempt to impose an incentive-based rule is
inherently retroactive.2' This thought is not novel. One may
20. Andrew Hayes, in the course of his discussion of chaos, however,
did make an indirect reference to the impossibility theorem: "As anecdot-
al proof of how long ideas can take to cross the barrier between scientific
and humanistic circles, consider the lag between Poincare's three-body
theorum [sic] in the 1890's and Kenneth Arrow's discovery of the equiva-
lent problem in economic choice theory in the early 1950's." Hayes, supra
note 2, at 757 n.36.
21. Difficult issues arise in the context of deciding whether a decision
should be made retroactive. A complete discussion of retroactivity juris-
prudence is beyond the scope of this Article. Retroactivity has been the
subject of numerous other articles; recent articles include the following:
Michael B. Dashjian, The Prospective Application of Judicial Legislation,
24 PAC. L.J. 317 (1993) (recounting the jurisprudence of retroactivity
generally and discussing its particular application in the context of stat-
utes of limitations for certain actions alleging securities fraud); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (discussing the
concept of "new law" in retroactivity jurisprudence, particularly in the
context of the law of remedies); Marshall J. Hartman, To Be or Not to
Be a "New Rule:' The Non-Retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitution-
al Rights After Conviction, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1992) (discussing
retroactivity in the context of federal habeas corpus); Mary C. Hutton,
Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State
Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421 (1993) (discussing retroac-
tivity in the context of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence and state
postconviction remedies); Lynda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters'. Teague
and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994) (discussing retroactivity
primarily in the context of habeas corpus jurisprudence); L. Anita Rich-
ardson & Leonard B. Mandell, Fairness over Fortuity: Retroactivity Revis-
ited and Revised, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 11 (discussing retroactivity in the
context of criminal law); John G. Crowley, Note, Retroactive Application
of Tennessee v. Garner to Civil Litigation, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 855, 860
(1989) (discussing "whether a new fourth amendment limitation on police
conduct should be applied retroactively in a civil lawsuit" and in civil
litigation generally); Paul E. McGreal, Note, Back to the Future: The
Supreme Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL>?
595 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence).
Retroactivity in the context treated in part III is discussed in David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 167 1995-1996
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well be concerned with a legal system that develops rules on
the basis of the incentives the rules create, without affording
individuals prior knowledge of the rules. Perhaps, had the
parties in a dispute known of the rules that would be devel-
oped, they would have acted differently. Yet difficult questions
concerning retroactivity cannot justify oscillations in judicial
doctrines. It is irrational to conclude that these short-term
dislocations are sufficient to prevent adoption of permanent
legal doctrines when the proffered alternative contemplates
ongoing, fundamental revision of legal principles every few
decades. This postulated view therefore does not justify fluctu-
ations in judicial doctrines.
The third possible meaning of Dean Scott's Justice Paradox,
that there is some bias causing future consequences to be un-
dervalued, reflects the concept of dynamics. Although this
postulate would explain oscillations, it does not condemn all
judicial doctrines to alternations; it so condemns only short-
sighted ones.
Dean Scott also asserts that this variation in legal doctrines
is not only inevitable but also desirable. He states that these
oscillations "keep[ I our legal system in a dynamic state of
continuous renewal and repair."' This assertion is senseless.
That a judicial system produces varying results when there is
no change in the relevant parameters does not necessarily
imply that it will produce desirable changes in results when
there is a significant change in a relevant parameter. The best
that can be said of such haphazard results is that the results
occasionally will be correct.
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1849-50 (1991).
The brief discussion above of retroactivity does not purport to be
novel. For purposes of this Article, the point is not whether particular
decisions should be made retroactive, or whether a "new" rule should not
be adopted because its application to actions taken before its adoption is
unfair. Rather, the point is that the costs of making wholesale changes
in the contours of judicially-created law are orders of magnitude greater
than the aggregate costs of one-time changes in legal rules.
22. Scott, supra note 2, at 350. See also Reynolds, supra note 2, at
115 ("It is at least possible that an inherently fluctuating judicial system
is a good thing in a larger sense, by injecting a sort of 'wild card' func-
tion into our governmental system as a whole.").
168 [Vol.48:161
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C. Nonlinear Dynamics
The preceding analysis, which contradicts the necessary
existence of a Justice Paradox, has not considered nonlinear
dynamics. Dean Scott's inclusion of the language of nonlinear
dynamics suggests that a higher order of thought-chaos theo-
ry-irrefutably proves the existence of the Justice Paradox. A
brief discussion of nonlinear dynamics rebuts that notion.
"Chaos" and the correlative term "chaotic" are more properly
understood as a type of behavior exhibited by certain nonlinear
dynamic' systems.2' Linear systems have been defined as
follows:
Linear systems are ones in which the equations of the
model are linear. A differential equation is linear if the coeffi-
cients are constants or functions only of the independent
variable. The most important property of linear systems
is ... that the response produced by the simultaneous appli-
cation of two different forcing functions is the sum of the two
individual responses."6
The meaning of this definition is not self-evident. The propor-
tionality manifested by a linear system means that where the
system has a particular response at a particular time after a
specified input is applied, a doubling of the input will produce
a doubled output at the same time. Linearity does not specify
the characteristics of the response; it does not require that the
time response of a system varies proportionately over time. For
example, an idealized mass attached to an idealized spring,
which may oscillate over time, is a linear system."
23. A formal definition of a dynamic system is as follows: "A system
is defined as a collection of matter, parts, or components which are in-
cluded inside a specified, often arbitrary boundary. In a dynamic system,
by definition, one or more aspects of the system change with time." J.
LOWEN SHEARER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEM DYNAMICS 2 (1967).
The importance of the dynamics of a system is discussed in a few legal
contexts in Royce de R. Barondes, Dynamic Economic Analyses of Selected
Provisions of Corporate Law: The Absolute Delegation Rule, Disclosure of
Intermediate Estimates and IPO Pricing, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 97 (1994).
24. HILBORN, supra note 1, at 4.
25. KATSUHIKO OGATA, MODERN CONTROL ENGINEERING 70 (1970).
26. HILBORN, supra note 1, at 5.
The meaning of linearity has been obscured in at least one other
1995] 169
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The term "chaotic behavior" describes responses of systems
that are aperiodic, i.e., not precisely repeating, and apparently
random.7 This type of response arises in nonlinear systems in
which there are forces that cause the results of nearby initial
conditions to diverge exponentially.' If an environment cre-
ates such responses and also imposes boundaries on the possi-
ble responses, the results may be chaotic. Because the out-
comes are bounded, the observed consequences may appear to
be random and intertwined as they approach and then with-
draw from boundaries.29 It is the surprising result of recent
developments in the study of nonlinear dynamics that some
aspects of these apparently random responses have quantita-
tive universal characteristics. °
Significantly, this type of response must be distinguished
from a system that does not produce a unique response to a
law review article. Professor Lawrence Cunningham recently published an
article analyzing the securities markets and certain aspects of corporate
and securities law accompanied by a discussion of chaos. Cunningham,
supra note 2. In a discussion of the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
he writes:
Linearity means proportionality: a change in one variable
produces a proportionate change in another specified vari-
able....
In contrast, nonlinearity means the absence of proportionali-
ty-changes in one variable will produce a change in another
variable but exponentially rather than proportionally. To take a
prosaic example, the one-ounce straw that breaks the one-ton
camel's back is nonlinear because the cause is utterly dispropor-
tionate to the effect.
Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted). Although a discontinuous response neces-
sarily involves nonlinear behavior, this example of a system manifesting
an invariant response except around a single point of discontinuity is not
truly representative of nonlinear responses.
27. HILBORN, supra note 1, at 7; EDWARD OTT, CHAOS IN DYNAMICAL
SYSTEMS 2 (1993).
28. HILBORN, supra note 1, at 138-39; OTT, supra note 27, at 19.
Exponential divergence over time means that the variation over time is
proportional to e', where e equals 2.72 (approximately), X is a constant
and t is time.
29. HILBORN, supra note 1, at 138-39.
30. Mitchell J. Feigenbaum, Foreword to HEINZ-OTrO PEITGEN ET AL.,
CHAOS AND FRAcTALs: NEW FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE 4-5 (1992); HILBORN,
supra note 1, at 4.
170
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fully specified set of conditions. A system is "chaotic" when
seemingly minuscule or indistinguishable differences in the
parameters of interest cause significant changes in effects. The
emphasis is on the word "seemingly." A system that produces
two or more possible responses to a single set of identical ini-
tial conditions is not chaotic3 " but random.
A text on nonlinear dynamics states, "All chaotic systems
are nonlinear, but not all nonlinear systems are chaotic." 2
For example, quasi-periodic nonlinear systems-systems that
simultaneously manifest responses having elements at two or
more different frequencies, where the ratio of two frequencies
is irrational-appear to manifest irregular responses, but they
are not chaotic.m
An authoritative quantitative analysis includes well-defined
assumptions and a rigorous analysis of those assumptions. A
recent text on nonlinear dynamics notes the importance of
quantifying these analyses:
Nonlinear dynamics and chaos, like most of contemporary
physical science and engineering, is intimately tied to math-
ematics. To apply the concepts of nonlinear dynamics to her
or his field, a scientist, engineer, economist, social scientist or
physician must come to grips with at least some of the for-
malism and quantitative formulations of nonlinear dynamics.
The concepts without the quantification are fruitless; like-
wise, quantification without the guide of concepts is blind
number shuffling. Both aspects are necessary.84
The two attempts to discuss the development of legal doctrines
in terms of nonlinear dynamics illustrate the first type of flaw
31. See HILBORN, supra note 1, at 76-77 (identifying this uniqueness
characteristic in the form of a "no-intersection theorem"); PEITGEN ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 11.
32. See HILBORN, supra note 1, at 8. The language quoted above
equating chaotic behavior with the response of a nonlinear system, see
supra text accompanying note 10, is in error.
33. See HILBORN, supra note 1, at 253.
34. Il at vi; see also Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of
Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1261 (1981) ("(The legal scholar
that ... borrow[s] only the bare theoretical concepts and explanatory
schemes of another discipline . . . runs the risk of trying to pull rabbits
out of an empty hat, and of deluding himself into thinking that he has
done so.").
1995]
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in quantitative or quasi-quantitative legal analyses-presenta-
tion of a simulated analysis suggesting, but lacking, rigor,
implying a spurious sense of precision.
Dean Scott attempts to justify oscillatory trends in judicial
development on the basis that all systems are chaotic. This
conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, nonlinear dynam-
ics teaches that not all dynamic systems are chaotic for param-
eter values within ranges of interest. Only those bounded sys-
tems that produce exponential divergence in the time response
of close initial conditions are chaotic. One need not have any
familiarity with the study of dynamics to reach that conclu-
sion. Even the most cursory examination of the complex devic-
es used in our society reveals countless items, such as the
computer on which this Article was drafted, that usually per-
form in a time-dependent yet predictable way to the range of
inputs that are actually experienced.'
Perhaps there is a plausible basis for making assumptions
necessary to conclude that the American judicial system is
chaotic. Yet those assumptions have not been set forth and
justified. Unless one can justify those necessary assumptions,
any attempt to conclude that a judicial system must produce
apparently random results is fundamentally devoid of any
foundation.
Second, the process of overruling precedents does not involve
the defining characteristic of chaotic behavior-seemingly
minor differences in initial conditions producing differing re-
sults."6 Rather, those judicial developments create alternative
results in identical circumstances. Dean Scott does not describe
a chaotic process; he instead describes a non-deterministic
one.
7
Dean Scott's discussion does not yield results that suggest
changes in the legal structure to diminish these oscillations.
35. For the skeptic who notes that his computer occasionally crashes
for unknown reasons, the point is that these occasional aberrations do
not dominate the item's performance.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. "A system is said to be deterministic if knowledge of the time-
evolution equations, the parameters that describe the system, and the
initial conditions . . . , in principle completely determine the subsequent
behavior of the system." HILBORN, supra note 1, at 7.
[Vol.48:161
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Moreover, his discussion is based on misstatements of the
results of the study of nonlinear dynamics. The limitation in
that discussion to drawing metaphorical links and avoiding a
complete quantitative specification permits his discussion to
conceal its flaws. 8
Large subsets of scientific analyses are inherently quantita-
tive. That quantification is a necessary element in the develop-
ment of corresponding scientific theories. Competing theories
are judged on the basis of the accuracy with which they predict
the results of actual items or processes. The proof is in the
numerical results. 9 In many, and perhaps most, contexts,
legal theory has not developed a scale, whether one-dimension-
al or multi-dimensional, on which to measure, in a quantita-
tive fashion, competing legal propositions."0 The absence of
such a standard underlies the limitation of many attempts to
incorporate quantitative analyses into legal scholarship and
accounts for the structure of metaphorical legal analyses. Yet
the absence of such a standard prevents the final, necessary
step of proper methodology--comparison of results predicted by
a theory to results experienced in practice. In an environment
lacking such standards, frameworks that organize factors to
permit pareto superior results may be powerful. Such an anal-
ysis is discussed below.41
The study of nonlinear dynamics itself represents an at-
tempt to find some order in complex systems, frequently as a
precursor to having some control over those systems. If the
study of nonlinear dynamics is to have any effect on legal
scholarship, it should be to provide inspiration in the pursuit
of a rational legal system.
Dean Scott's article illustrates the difficulties that can arise
when a sophisticated quantitative analysis is used as a meta-
38. These flaws may well have been exacerbated by Dean Scott's pri-
mary reliance, in discussing the conclusions of the study of nonlinear
dynamics, on JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987), a
"[riather journalistic and hyperbolic" popularization on chaos. HILBORN,
supra note 1, at 42.
39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 66-67
(1990).
40. See id. at 69.
41. See infra part III.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 173 1995-1996
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:161
phor. The inherent problem with such metaphorical analyses is
not unique to attempts to incorporate nonlinear dynamics into
legal scholarship. For example, in constitutional jurisprudence,
attempts to weigh in a cost-benefit analysis the advantages
and harms of different types are metaphorical and suspect, ab-
sent some ability to assign the non-zero costs and benefits to a
single scale.42 In the absence of plausible corresponding as-
sumptions and a reduction to useful conclusions, the metaphor
provides solely an interesting line of thought to be pursued,
the support for whose conclusions remains to be provided.
II. MISLEADING QUASI-SCIENTIFIC TERMINOLOGY
A second misapplication of quantitative theory to legal schol-
arship involves the use of quasi-scientific terminology. For
example, the link between relativity and constitutional juris-
prudence is not self-evident. Professor Laurence Tribe attempt-
ed to fill this void in an essay published in 1989. 43 Professor
42. For example, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
[T]he Court's decisions over the past decade have made plain
that the entire enterprise of attempting to assess the benefits
and the costs of the exclusionary rule in various contexts is a
virtually impossible task for the judiciary to perform honestly or
accurately. Although the Court's language in those cases suggests
that some specific empirical basis may support its analyses, the
reality is that the Court's opinions represent inherently unstable
compounds of intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces of partial
and often inconclusive data.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 942 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A similar sentiment was expressed by Justice Marshall: "The majority
now proposes to return to the scales of social utility to calculate whether
Miranda's prophylactic rule remains cost-effective when threats to the
public's safety are added to the balance. The results of the majority's,
'test' are announced with pseudo-scientific precision." New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 681 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It has been
more directly suggested that these attempts to employ cost-benefit analy-
ses reflect malignant attempts to preordain the conclusions of the analy-
ses. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 700 (1985) ("cost-benefit
analysts can smuggle in their preferences and thus give their tinkering
with the existing distribution of wealth the sham rigor of scientific ratio-
nality").
43. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
174
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Tribe notes that there is a long tradition of speaking of legal
issues in terminology borrowed from the sciences. He writes,
'Early in our nation's history it was commonplace, for example,
to say that the 1787 Constitution was Newtonian in design,
with its carefully counterpoised forces and counterforces, its
checks and balances, structured like a 'machine that would go
of itself' to meet the crises of the future."
Professor Tribe does acknowledge the difficulties inherent in
applying quantitative analyses in areas where the factors to be
weighed cannot be assigned quantitative values on a single
scale.45 Yet his analysis takes a different, troublesome turn.
He states:
Newton's conception of space as empty, unstructured back-
ground parallels the legal paradigm in which state power,
including judicial power, stands apart from the neutral, "nat-
ural" order of things....
A parallel conception in the legal universe would hold that,
just as space cannot extricate itself from the unfolding story
of physical reality, so also the law cannot extract itself from
social structures; it cannot "step back," establish an "Archi-
medean" reference point of detached neutrality, and selec-
tively reach in, as though from the outside, to make fine-
tuned adjustments to highly particularized conflicts. Each
legal decision restructures the law itself, as well as the social
setting in which law operates, because, like all human activi-
ty, the law is inevitably embroiled in the dialectical process
whereby society is constantly recreating itself."
Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
That article is not alone in discussing jurisprudence in light of modem
physics. E.g., Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV.
429, 444-47 (1987) (placing critical legal studies in the context of modem
developments in physics); Elise Porter, Note, The Player and the Dice:
Physics and Critical Legal Theory, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1571 passim (1991)
(discussing Williams, supra, and modern physics).
44. Tribe, supra note 43, at 3 (footnote omitted).
45. Ic. at 1, 2 n.2 (asserting "attempts to reduce human issues to
cost-benefit equations, as people in the law and economics movement
sometimes do, are bound to be distorting").
46. Id. at 7-8.
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He then extends his analysis in the context of DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.7 DeShaney
concerned a child who had received repeated beatings from his
father, which left him with permanent brain damage.48 The
child and his mother brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against various state actors, claiming that their failure to pro-
tect the child deprived him of his liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 The Court
held that the State did not endanger the child and therefore
had no constitutional duty to protect the child.' Professor
Tribe criticizes the Court's focus on whether the State directly
abused the child.51 He suggests that the Court should have
considered whether the State's law, "taken in its entirety,
warp[s] the legal landscape so that it in effect deflected the
assistance otherwise available to [the child]."5 2 He terms this
type of insight "post-Newtonian. " '
His question may raise productive lines of constitutional
analysis. To the extent the question was raised in Professor
Tribe's mind in whole or in part as a result of his exposure to
relativity, those who find the question to be useful might well
feel some gratitude towards physicists. Yet the application of
"Newtonian" and "post-Newtonian" labels is inherently mis-
leading. These labels lead to an enticingly easy conclusion that
any analysis labeled "post-Newtonian" is preferable.
This categorization suggests that a "Newtonian" analysis is
inherently materially incorrect. Yet appraisals relying on older,
more traditional techniques can produce accurate results, in
both the study of mechanics and legal scholarship. And that a
line of inquiry is novel does not assure its sufficiency. In the
context of physics, an analysis of a system employing Newtoni-
an mechanics may provide straightforward results of adequate
accuracy.54 Depending on the particular context, consideration
47. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
48. Id. at 191-93.
49. I& at 193.
50. Id. at 201.
51. Tribe, supra note 43, at 10.
52. 1&
53. Id. at 11.
54. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL
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of refinements from relativity may not be necessary.
Similarly, understanding the validity of Professor Tribe's
"post-Newtonian" perspective requires careful consideration of
whether the relevant legal context justifies his approach. It is
not controversial to assert that the contours of legal rules may
affect the conduct of members of society. Yet merely asserting
that a complex, counterintuitive relationship exists does not
prove the point. In DeShaney, the State's actions may have
been too remote from the injury suffered to impose liability on
governmental actors.r'
The harm of this terminology extends beyond its invitation
of scorn for imbedding meaningless comparisons in the lan-
guage of legal scholars. In an environment where the meaning
and the limitations of the distinctions between Newtonian and
relativistic mechanics are not commonly well understood, the
application of scientific labels may substitute for a considered
analysis of the materiality of these secondary effects. Further-
more, misleading labels frame the inquiry in a manner that
biases the conclusions and deceives scholars into disregarding
certain lines of thought that have been characterized as reflect-
ing antiquated principles. Such terminology facilitates lexical
legerdemain, obfuscating logical leaps.' In addition to distort-
ing the answers, the use of such language engenders in the
reader a false sense of understanding the scientific area. Curi-
THEORY 13 (Robert W. Lawson trans., 15th ed. Crown Trade Paperbacks
1961) (1952) ("Even though classical mechanics does not supply us with a
sufficiently broad basis for the theoretical presentation of all physical
phenomena, still we must grant it a considerable measure of truth,' since
it supplies us with the actual motions of the heavenly bodies with a
delicacy of detail little short of wonderful.").
55. Of course, this thought is not unique to relativistic mechanics. The
same concept, proximate causation, plays an integral part in the law of
torts. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 44 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the "intervening causes"
element of proximate causation).
56. See Charny, supra note 21, at 1837 n.84 (questioning the analogy
drawn by Professor Tribe); Pierre Schlag, The Brilliant, the Curious, and
the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV. 917, 917-18 (1987) ("For some reason, when
that foreign terminology is commandeered and applied to law, all our
legal artifacts and problems mysteriously seem to fall into place-leaving
us in complete wonder as to why no one has thought of doing this be-
fore.").
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ously, Professor Tribe himself, in criticizing the use of another
quantitative theoretical approach in legal scholarship, law and
economics, identified a strikingly similar concern:
[T]he Supreme Court's failure to take ... concerns [bearing
on distribution of wealth and power] seriously is no less trou-
bling if the cost-benefit patina is but a mask for substantive
judgments arrived at through other means, than it is if the
cost-benefit imagery genuinely mirrors what the Court under-
stands itself to be doing.
6 7
The division of the discussion above into parts I and II is not
intended to imply that the parts discuss discrete, unrelated
issues. Each part discusses a point on a spectrum of analyses
lacking necessary elements for completeness. Thus, through its
omissions, each discussion remains confined to the realm of
speculation.
III. QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES ADRIFT FROM ANCHORING
ASSUMPTIONS-FDIC v. W.R. GRACE & CO.
A. Background
The preceding parts address abstract applications of quanti-
tative theories that are at most tangentially related to the
legal issue analyzed. Yet quantitative theories can be more
directly applied to legal issues. FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co." is
a fertile source for discussion of the manipulation of quanti-
tative analyses.
57. Tribe, supra note 6, at 598 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 608,
620 & n.164 (describing the cost-benefit discussion in one Court opinion
as a "charade"; interpreting another author as "noting the deceptive na-
ture of legal rhetoric that draws upon the abstractions of bureaucratic
theory, such as 'expertise'"; and stating, "Perhaps this analytic escape
hatch is simply the latest in a series of accountability-avoiding devic-
es-one ideally suited to a judiciary . . . dazzled by the scientist's mas-
tery of mathematical techniques . . . ."); cf Laurence H. Tribe, Seven
Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo.Scientific
Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 168 (1984) ("[A]bdicating responsibility for
choice . . . is the great appeal of all fundamental faiths, including faith
in technical expertise and in methods like cost-benefit analysis .... They
create an illusion, a comforting illusion, of inexorability.").
58. 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990).
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FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. concerned a $75 million non-re-
course loan facility extended by Continental Illinois National
Bank to W.R. Grace, the proceeds of which were used to fi-
nance part of the $87 million purchase price for an interest in
three natural gas fields.59 The interest in the natural gas
fields constituted the sole security for the loan facility. ° On
March 14, 1980, Continental Illinois issued a commitment
letter, stating that it was "pleased to commit to provide
$75,000,000 in a production payment loan for the benefit of
W.R. Grace & Co."' The commitment letter stated that it was
"subject to satisfactory documentation." 2 At the beginning of
April 1980, Continental Illinois sent W.R. Grace two five-page,
single-spaced letters, each setting forth summaries of the ma-
jor terms of the loan.6"
Before receiving the loan commitment, W.R. Grace had de-
livered to Continental Illinois a reserve report concerning the
fields, prepared by an independent firm. The report was re-
viewed by Continental Illinois' own engineer." After the com-
mitment letter was delivered, W.R. Grace continued to receive
additional information concerning the ongoing activity to deter-
mine the quantity of gas in the fields. By May 18, 1980,
W.R. Grace learned that one of the three fields, which W.R.
Grace had previously valued at $15.5 million, would produce
59. Id. at 617-18. The opinion describes the loan being extended to,
and the purchase being made by, W.R. Grace and/or its wholly owned
subsidiary, Grace Petroleum Corporation. Id at 618. This description in
the opinion simplifies the actual fact pattern. In fact, W.R. Grace had as-
signed its rights to the interest to The Leadership Foundation, Inc., a
non-profit organization. Conveyance of Production Payment, dated as of
July 1, 1980, between Grace Petroleum Corporation and The Leadership
Foundation, Inc. (on file with author); Loan Agreement, dated as of July
1, 1980, between The Leadership Foundation, Inc., and Continental Illi-
nois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (on file with author).
Because the opinion in FDIC v. W.R Grace & Co. refers to W.R. Grace
as the borrower, this Article retains that simplification.
60. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 617.
61. Id at 618 (quoting the commitment letter).
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 617.
65. Id. at 618.
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no gas.6 W.R. Grace first tried not to close the acquisition.
Ultimately W.R. Grace agreed to proceed with the transaction,
which was structured to include a covenant that allowed W.R.
Grace to* bring an action against the seller alleging improper
failure to disclose information concerning the non-producing
field.' The purchase closed on that basis on May 2 7 ."
Although the definitive loan agreement was executed July 1,
1980, and W.R. Grace drew funds shortly thereafter, 9 W.R.
Grace did not disclose the new information concerning the
value of the fields until three years later." Continental Illi-
nois subsequently filed suit against W.R. Grace, alleging that
Continental Illinois had been fraudulently induced into extend-
ing the loan.7'
The opinion, written by Judge Posner, raises several issues
concerning the practical application of quantitative analyses by
judges. The case presents two fundamental legal issues: (i) the
extent of any binding obligation created by a preliminary in-
strument and (ii) the extent to which parties to contracts are
required to disclose material information to the other party in
the absence of an express contractual provision unambiguously
addressing the matter. The second of these issues, the scope of
the duty to disclose, was resolved by the court on the basis of
economic theory. A review of the underpinnings of the court's
analysis yields useful insights into the limitations of quantita-
tive legal analyses.
The facts of FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. relevant to these two
legal issues are interrelated. Without a complete discussion of
the extent to which preliminary instruments create binding
obligations, it is difficult to appreciate fully Judge Posner's
economic analysis concerning the duty to disclose. Before turn-
ing to that economic inquiry, therefore, the scope of the bind-
ing obligations created by preliminary instruments is reviewed.
66. 1&




71. Id. at 616. Continental Illinois subsequently assigned the loan to
the FDIC. Id. at 616-17.
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B. The Extent to Which Preliminary Documents Are Binding
Obligations Under Preliminary Instruments. Preliminary
instruments signed before definitive documentation may create
a variety of contractual relationships.72 First, the instrument
may create a binding substantive agreement, with secondary
or customary additional terms to be supplied by a court in the
case of litigation.73 Second, the instrument could create a rela-
72. This subpart III.B emphasizes recent cases concerning preliminary
documents. A discussion of the issues addressed in this subpart III.B,
with a detailed identification of cases that are not referenced in this
Article, including older cases, is contained in 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 3.8-3.8c, 3.26, 3.26b-c (1990 & Supp.
1994).
73. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
217, 250-51 (1987); see Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 F.3d
1058, 1065 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Louisiana law in the context of a
letter agreement setting forth the terms of a lease that were to be docu-
mented subsequently), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2710 (1994); Computer Sys.
of Am., Inc. v. IBM, 795 F.2d 1086, 1087, 1089-91 (1st Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing, under Texas law, that it was a jury question to decide whether a
binding agreement to lease a computer, at an annual rate of $801,660,
was created by a five sentence letter identifying the computer, the term
and the lease rate, which also stated, "This lease is dependent upon
satisfactory contractual arrangement."); Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua
Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 589 n.3, 590-92 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding, un-
der Ohio law, that it was a question of fact to decide whether a contract
had been formed by a detailed memorandum of intent, notwithstanding
that the memorandum stated, "The obligations of [the parties] shall be
subject to fulfillment of the following conditions: . . . preparation of the
definitive agreement for the proposed combination in form and content
satisfactory to both parties and their respective counsel [and certain
other conditions]."); V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 n.3, 500 (2d
Cir. 1968) (holding under New York law that correspondence constituted
a binding agreement for the purchase of a business), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 921 (1969); I.R.V. Merchandising Corp. v. Jay Ward Prods., Inc., 856
F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating, under New York law, "The
fact that the parties had not resolved all of the terms of the contract
weighs in favor of a finding that no contract existed. However, it does
not preclude the existence of a contract."); Weinreich v. Sandhaus, 850 F.
Supp. 1169, 1177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that, under New York law,
a preliminary agreement created binding substantive obligations, stating,
"mhe existence of open terms does not per se defeat a finding of a con-
tract. Indeed, 'a court should find an agreement too indefinite only as a
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 181 1995-1996
182 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:161
"last resort" when it is "satisfied that the agreement cannot be rendered
reasonably certain by reference to an extrinsic standard that makes its
meaning clear."'") (citation omitted); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of
Am. v. Coaxial Communications, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that a commitment letter for a $55 million loan, which
stated that it created a binding obligation to lend and borrow, constituted
a binding obligation to lend and borrow); Sav-a-Stop Inc. v. Jaydon, Inc.
(In re Say-a-Stop Inc.), 124 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[The
fact that an agreement may provide that a further more specific agree-
ment will be entered into later does not affect the enforceability of the
original agreement. . . . The agreement to agree is enforceable if it is
sufficiently specific to be capable of implementation and all the essential
elements are set forth.") (citations omitted); Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (hold-
ing in a bench trial, under New York law, that a commitment letter for
a loan was binding, obligating the respective parties to borrow and lend
money, and that the prospective borrower breached that agreement by
failing to negotiate in good faith a penalty payable on default on the
loan), appeal denied, 816 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1987); Quake Constr., Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill. 1990) ("[Allthough let-
ters of intent may be enforceable, such letters are not necessarily en-
forceable unless the parties intend them to be contractually binding."); id.
at 992-94, 996 (holding that it was a question of fact to decide whether
a detailed letter of intent that stated (i) that the sender of the letter had
elected to award the contract to the recipient and (ii) that it "authorizes
the work," was binding, notwithstanding a statement that the other party
"reserves the right to cancel this letter of intent if the parties cannot
agree on a fully executed subcontract agreement"); Heritage Broadcasting
Co. v. Wilson Communications, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) ("A contract to make a subsequent contract is not per se unen-
forceable; in fact, it may be just as valid as any other contract. To be
enforceable, a contract to enter into a future contract must specify all its
material and essential terms and leave none to be agreed upon as the
result of future negotiations.") (citations omitted); id. at 785-87 (holding
that a letter of intent for a purchase and sale that stated that the obli-
gation of the purchaser to purchase was subject to execution of a defini-
tive agreement within 45 days, that the seller would exclusively deal
with the purchaser within that 45 days and that "[i]t is intended that
the [letter of intent] will be incorporated into a definitive agreement,"
was an agreement binding on the seller, notwithstanding the failure to
execute a definitive agreement within 45 days, since "[tihe definitive
agreement would have added only the mechanics necessary to accomplish
the conveyance"). See generally Joanna Schmidt, Preliminary Agreements
in International Contract Negotiation, 6 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 37, 48 (1983)
(referring to such agreements as "provisional contracts" designated to last
only for the duration of the negotiation).
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tionship in which some terms are resolved, only in the sense
that they will be a part of any definitive agreement that is
reached, coupled with a contractually binding undertaking to
negotiate the remainder of the terms in good faith.74 This type
of instrument creates no contractually binding, complete agree-
ment concerning the substance of the primary transaction.
Third, the resulting document could be a framework for fur-
ther negotiations, with no binding contractual obligation im-
posed on any party.75
In the case of preliminary letters concerning the sale of goods un-
der the Uniform Commercial Code, the code specifies that the parties
may enter into a binding agreement, notwithstanding the failure to state
a price, in which case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
delivery. U.C.C. § 2-305, 1 U.L.A. 47-48 (1989); see Harvey L. Temkin,
When Does the "Fat Lady' Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Princi-
ple' in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 131 n.25 (1986).
74. Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795
F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986) (construing Pennsylvania law); Commer-
cial Mktg., Inc. v. Atlantic Computer Sys. Inc. (In re Atlantic Computer
Sys., Inc.), 154 B.R. 166, 168, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that no
such agreement was reached, where (i) the document made no reference
to a "binding agreement"; (ii) the subject matter, a portfolio of assets,
was not specified; (iii) a definitive agreement remained to be executed;
and (iv) the document stated that the agreement was subject to board
approval); In re Allegheny Intl, Inc., 117 B.R. 171, 177 (W.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding that a commitment letter that stated, "If you accept and agree
to this proposal, please so indicate by signing in the space provided be-
low," was a binding preliminary commitment, even though the letter
reserved rights of approval; and stating that such a reservation permitted
a party to demand customary protection); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n
of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("For the
parties can bind themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement in the
sense that they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in
good faith in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that
has been settled in the preliminary agreement."); Farnsworth, supra note
73, at 251; Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 684-86 (1969) (naming such an agreement a "con-
tract to bargain"); see Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract,
60 TUL. L. REV. 751, 786 (1986) ("[O]ne seeking the shelter of a no-bind-
ing-effect clause must observe the overriding demands of good faith.").
75. See Beck v. American Health Group Intl, Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 237,
239 n.1, 242 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a letter that stated, "It is a
pleasure to draft the outline of our future agreement," recited basic
terms and stated, "If this is a general understanding of the agreement, I
1995] 183
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There are practical reasons why sophisticated parties may
wish to segment the process of reaching a definitive agreement
by creating one or more intermediate steps.7" The expenses
involved in reaching a definitive agreement may be sufficiently
large that the parties desire to receive at least a nebulous
assurance before proceeding." The parties may wish to agree
on some basic terms before undertaking the negotiation of a
plethora of other issues.7" One party may seek to obtain some
assurance that a definitive agreement can be reached, or
reached within specified limits, prior to delivering a bid to, or
contracting with, another party. A transaction may require the
participation of a governmental entity, for example as a guar-
antor. In such a case, the governmental entity may be unwill-
ing to consider whether the proposed transaction is the type of
transaction in which it will participate, unless all private par-
ties have agreed to participate.79 To achieve these goals, par-
ties may employ a preliminary instrument that imposes an
ask that you sign a copy of this letter, so that I might forward it to
Corporate Counsel for the drafting of a contract," did not constitute a
binding agreement). This tripartite taxonomy of these arrangements is
not unique to this Article. See, e.g., Temkin, supra note 73, at 127-30.
76. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.8c, at 205; Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs:
A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621,
647 n.84 (1993); see, e.g., Magallanes Inv., Inc. v. Circuit Sys., Inc., 994
F.2d 1214, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993) (identifying this mechanism in ship
sales).
77. Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir.
1988) (enumerating the benefits of a letter of intent prior to costly nego-
tiations); Holmes, supra note 74, at 776-77 (discussing preliminary agree-
ments in the context of public offerings).
78. Holmes, supra note 74, at 777 ("to memorialize the substance of
their agreement at its current stage and to provide an impetus to con-
summate the bargain"); Mark K. Johnson, Note, Enforceability of
Precontractual Agreements in Illinois: The Need for a Middle Ground, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 939, 941 (1993); see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, §
3.8c, at 205; Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 258; Schmidt, supra note 73,
at 51.
79. Holmes, supra note 74, at 777; Johnson, supra note 78, at 941;
e.g., Newport, 6 F.3d at 1061 (considering a letter agreement for a lease,
which the Department of Housing and Urban Development required to
demonstrate the prospective lessee's actual commitment as a condition to
the processing of a grant request).
184 [Vol.48:161
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 184 1995-1996
CHAOS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
obligation of some type on the parties. Other preliminary in-
struments may serve as mechanisms by which the parties
disseminate potential terms as a basis for further negotiations,
with no intention of creating binding obligations.
It may be complex and difficult to decide which of these
three types of documents any particular preliminary instru-
ment represents. Courts have identified various factors, in-
cluding the following: (i) the language of the agreement;' (ii)
the context of the negotiations;"1 (iii) whether there are open
material terms; 2 (iv) whether there has been partial perfor-
80. Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d
Cir. 1989); Knight v. Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 1989) (constru-
ing Mississippi law); Atlantic Computer Sys., 154 B.R. at 170; Tribune,
670 F. Supp. at 499. The language is the most important factor. Arcadi-
an Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; Weinreich, 850 F. Supp. at 1177
(following New York law); Atlantic Computer Sys., 154 B.R. at 170; Tri-
bune, 670 F. Supp. at 499. In Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 592
N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. 1992), the court construed a letter of intent that
stated:
[T]his letter is not intended to create, nor do you or we present-
ly have any binding legal obligation whatever in any way relat-
ing to such sale and purchase other than [certain specified
items]. No further obligation will arise until a definitive agree- -
ment is reduced to writing and executed ...
However, it is our intention, and, we understand, your
intention immediately to proceed in good faith in the negotiation
of such binding definitive agreement ....
Id. at 1291 n.2. Construing that letter, the court stated:
It is also elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be
enforced according to its terms. There is no ambiguity in the let-
ter of intent . . . . The parties clearly stated certain contractual
commitments to which they were binding themselves and, just as
clearly, they followed those commitments with an expression of
their intention to proceed to negotiate in good faith. That this
expression of intent follows the parties' disclaimer of binding
effect and begins with the word "however" does not elevate its
status from a mere expression of intent into a binding obligation.
Id& at 1292 (citation and footnote omitted). Other cases identifying this
factor and other factors are collected at 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, §
3.8.
81. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; Atlantic Computer Sys., 154
B.R. at 170; see Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 500-02.
82. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; Knight, 875 F.2d at 523
(construing Mississippi law); Weinreich, 850 F. Supp. at 1176-77 (constru-
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mance; 3 (v) "the necessity of putting the agreement in final
ing New York law); Atlantic Computer Sys., 154 B.R. at 170; Quake
Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 997; Carmon v. Soleh Boneh Ltd., 614 N.Y.S.2d
555, 556 (App. Div. 1994) ("where an agreement contains open terms,
calls for future approval, and expressly anticipates future preparation and
execution of contract documents, there is a strong presumption against
finding a binding and enforceable obligation"); Johnson, supra note 78, at
943. However, "[tihe fact that some matters may have been left for fu-
ture agreement does not necessarily preclude a finding of intent to con-
tract during preliminary negotiations." A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for
Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1989) (construing Illinois law); see Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 502; 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.8, at 181-82; cf Andrew R. Klein, Com-
ment, Devil's Advocate: Salvaging the Letter of Intent, 37 EMoRY L.J.
139, 145 (1988) ("whether the agreement was sufficiently definitive to be
enforced"). But see Butler, 626 F. Supp. at 1234-35 (holding that, under
New York law, a prospective borrower breached its obligation to negotiate
in good faith under a commitment letter, where the prospective lender
insisted that a prepayment penalty identified in the commitment letter be
given full effect in the definitive documentation by providing for pay-
ments due on default to include a penalty).
83. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; Knight, 875 F.2d at 523;
Weinreich, 850 F. Supp. at 1176-77; I.R.V. Merchandising Corp., 856 F.
Supp. at 172-73 (applying New York law); Atlantic Computer Sys., 154
B.R. at 170; Sand Creek Country Club, Ltd. v. CSO Architects, Inc., 582
N.E.2d 872, 874-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming a trial court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law that a letter from an architectural firm to
a client, that (i) stated, "[N]othing contained in this letter shall bind
either until [an AIA contract] is executed," (ii) stated that billings would
be delayed until financing was secured and (iii) was signed as "accepted"
by the client, obligated the client to pay for services rendered, notwith-
standing absence of a final agreement); Holmes, supra note 74, at 782
("Regardless of the common understanding of the effect given to letters of
intent . . . such expressions are significant only to an essentially execu-
tory agreement. Once one side has rendered substantial performance,
parties cannot safely rely upon expressions of intent to effect a return to
the status quo ante. . . . [Elven where a writing may be understood in
ordinary usage not to represent a legal obligation, it will acquire increas-
ingly binding characteristics as performance overlaps intention.") (foot-
notes omitted); Johnson, supra note 78, at 943. But cf Murray v. Abt
Assocs., 18 F.3d 1376, 1377-79 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district
court's holding on summary judgment that, under Illinois law, where the
parties continued to pursue the goals of a binding term sheet after the
express termination date, the parties had no implied duty to negotiate in
good faith toward each other); Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 998 (indicat-
ing that a letter of intent could authorize actions in reliance without
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form, as indicated by the customary form of such transac-
tions";' (vi) whether the parties are sophisticated and repre-
sented by counsel;' (vii) the amount of money involved;"
(viii) the scope of the details inherent in the transaction;' (ix)
the reasons for the ultimate abandonment of negotiations;"
waiving a condition precedent to the formation of a contract).
However, a court may hold that where there has been partial per-
formance of an agreement, but a provision that leaves terms open for
future agreement has not yet been performed, the provision with open
terms is void for indefiniteness. MCB Ltd. v. McGowan, 359 S.E.2d 50,
53-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding void a provision in a deed of trust
under which the beneficiary agreed to subordinate the lien of the deed of
trust "in such amount as may be reasonably requested by the [g]rantors"
to secure permanent financing (quoting the deed of trust)).
84. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; accord Knight, 875 F.2d at
523; Atlantic Computer Sys., 154 B.R. at 170; Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at
503 ("it would better be put in terms of whether in the relevant business
community, it is customary to accord binding force to the type of infor-
mal or preliminary agreement at issue"); Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at
994 ("whether the type of agreement involved is one usually put into
writing"); Carmon, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 556; cf. Gel Sys. Inc. v. Hyundai
Eng'g & Constr. Co., 902 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating, under
Massachusetts law, that reference to a future document creates a "strong
inference" of an intention not to be bound); Viking Broadcasting Corp. v.
Snell Publishing Co., 497 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Neb. 1993) (citing the ab-
sence of detail in a 1-3/4 page letter of intent for a $14 million acquisi-
tion in holding that the letter of intent, as a matter of law, did not
create a binding obligation to sell/purchase).
85. Kinko's Graphics Corp. v. Townsend, 803 F. Supp. 1450, 1456-57
(S.D. Ind. 1992) (construing Indiana law); see Coaxial Communications,
799 F. Supp. at 18; 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.8, at 183;
Holmes, supra note 74, at 790 ("One would expect that among parties of
the same status, courts would be more willing to respect expressions of
intent than when dealing with parties of unequal bargaining power. In
the ordinary case, sophisticated parties dealing at arm's length could be
expected to abide by the rules they impose upon themselves. Only in the
event of some superseding flaw in the bargaining process should a court
intervene to impose obligations not voluntarily assumed.").
86. Knight, 875 F.2d at 523 (construing Mississippi law); Quake
Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 994; Temkin, supra note 73, at 132; see 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.8, at 183.
87. Knight, 875 F.2d at 523; Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 994; John-
son, supra note 78, at 943; see Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d
810, 816 (7th Cir. 1987) (construing Wisconsin law).
88. Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 994.
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and (x) whether the agreement indicates that it is subject to
future approvals.89
The decisions both among jurisdictions and within particular
jurisdictions are inconsistent. ° At one extreme, some jurisdic-
tions, frequently terming these documents "agreements to
agree," hold that preliminary instruments that leave material
terms to be negotiated are not enforceable agreements concern-
ing their subject matter. 1 Other jurisdictions hold that such
89. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 73; Atlantic Computer Sys., 154
B.R. at 170; Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 500 (stating that such a reserva-
tion tends to indicate, but does not conclusively establish, an intention
not to be bound); see Gel Sys., 902 F.2d at 1028 (citing the required ap-
proval of a third party in applying Massachusetts law). Separate issues
involving fiduciary duties arise where the transaction ultimately requires
the approval of the shareholders. See Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 249
n.125; Klein, supra note 82, at 150-69; Temkin, supra note 73, at 126.
Those additional issues are not discussed here.
90. Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 259-60 ("It would be difficult to find
a less predictable area of contract law."); Temkin, supra note 73, at 131
n.24; Stephen R. Volk, The Letter of Intent, 16 INST. ON SEC. REG. 143,
145 (1985); see Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 1009 (Stamos, J., specially
concurring) ("in these fact-intensive cases the decisions have varied wide-
ly"). For example, the Arcadian Phosphates court stated that an agree-
ment to negotiate can be enforceable. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at
72. Yet it held that a document termed an "agreement" that provided
that both parties agreed "to cooperate fully and work judiciously in order
to expedite the closing date and consummate the sale of the business"
did not create a binding obligation to negotiate. Id. at 70-72. The factual
support for this holding was that (i) the agreement specified that certain
amounts to be paid by the prospective purchaser would be refunded if no
agreement were reached and (ii) a sales agreement remained to be nego-
tiated. Id. It is not clear why one party's prudence in specifying that ad-
vances be returned should negotiations fail is inconsistent with agreeing
to negotiate in good faith.
91. The following cases are recent examples: Consolidated Grain &
Barge Co. v. Madgett, 928 F.2d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 1991), concerned a
letter agreement between parties who were co-defendants in a class ac-
tion suit. The letter agreement provided that the parties "will negotiate
in good faith" the parties' shares of funds to be received under a contract
to which one of the co-defendants became a party by virtue of a settle-
ment of the class action suit. Id. The parties had determined to enter
this agreement in lieu of postponing settlement of the class action until a
definitive agreement was reached on this issue. Id. The plaintiff com-
plained that the monies that it had been receiving were inadequate and
that the other co-defendant refused to negotiate, as required by the letter
[Vol.48:161
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agreement, except in the context of negotiating other matters. Id. The
court held that this agreement to negotiate was unenforceable, noting
that the court had no basis to determine the correct amount and could
not realistically compel negotiations. Id. at 817-18 (construing the laws of
Minnesota and Missouri, which the court held to be the same on this
point). The court expressly declined to apply federal labor law precedents
to the issue. Id. at 818 n.2.
In Knight v. Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1989), the court
affirmed in part a magistrate's order appended to the opinion, which
stated, "Mississippi . . . has never recognized contracts to negotiate nor
contracts to make a contract."
Feldman v. Allegheny Intl, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988)
(construing Illinois law) concerned a letter of intent for the sale of cer-
tain subsidiaries. The court described the letter as follows:
[The letter of intent] committ[ed] [the seller] not to "hold discus-
sions or negotiate with any person other than [the plaintiffl" on
the sale of the food companies "while the proposed acquisition is
being pursued." The letter specified that the sale price would
involve a minimum cash component of $11 million, but otherwise
left open the details of the transaction. It also stated that "[i]t is
understood that this is not a binding agreement and that the
obligations and rights of the parties shall be set forth in the
definitive agreement executed by the parties."
Id- at 1219 (quoting the letter in part). It appears that the seller may
have been negotiating with a third party during the last three weeks of
the negotiations under the letter of intent; the seller solicited and re-
ceived a proposal from a third party to whom the subsidiaries were ulti-
mately sold. See id. at 1219-20. The court reasoned:
The proper recourse is to walk away from the bargaining table,
not to sue for "bad faith" in negotiations. . . . Both parties were
free to end the arrangement and move on if they felt that dis-
cussions were progressing too slowly or they had reached a stale-
mate and believed they had better prospects elsewhere.
I& at 1223. But cf id. at 1224 ("The letter may give rise to some en-
forceable obligations, in particular, the right to some degree of exclusive
bargaining for some time."). As in many opinions, the meaning of this
case is obscured by the court's omission of the full text of the letter of
intent. The exclusive dealing language is in conflict with the language
stating that no binding obligation is made. The relative location of the
sentences might have indicated that no binding obligation to sell was
made, but the parties intended to negotiate exclusively.
In Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987)
(construing Wisconsin law), the court stated, "The letter could be treated
as an 'agreement to agree' on the open terms. . . . As an 'agreement to
agree', however, it is not enforceable."
Kinko's Graphics Corp. v. Townsend, 803 F. Supp. 1450, 1452-53
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(S.D. Ind. 1992), concerned an oral agreement on the term, rental rate
and payment of utilities of a commercial lease of identified premises,
which was followed by a fax from the potential landlord's agent. The fax
stated, "Agreement is effective per verbal communication with [the po-
tential landlord]. Details to follow." Id. at 1453. The court stated:
If it seems implausible that a few scribbled lines on a FAX
would lead a reasonable party to believe that [the potential ten-
ant] was licensed to take the actions that he ultimately took,
[which included taking possession,] the possibility is even more
remote that the FAX embodies the terms of their compact. These
circumstances indicate that if the FAX was anything, it probably
was little more than an agreement to agree. In Indiana, agree-
ments to agree are not enforceable.
I& at 1457 (citation and footnote omitted).
In Beck v. American Health Group Int'l, Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 237,
242 (Ct. App. 1989), the court stated that an "agreement to agree" is
unenforceable, without indicating whether the parties may bind them-
selves in the types of contracts described supra at text accompanying
notes 73-74.
In Crowe-Thomas Consulting Group, Inc. v. Fresh Pak Candy Co.,
494 N.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992), the court in construing a
letter that stated that it was a "letter of interest only and is subject to
the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement," affirmed the
trial court's finding that the letter was not an offer and acceptance for
purposes of determining whether a business brokerage fee became due
and payable. The court did not discuss duties to negotiate in good faith
(which the letter of intent expressly disclaimed); rather, it recited that an
agreement to enter a contract is unenforceable where any terms are left
to future negotiation. Id.
The court in Hansen v. Phillips Beverage Co., 487 N.W.2d 925, 927
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted), stated, "This letter creates mere-
ly an agreement to negotiate in good faith. Under Minnesota law, such
an agreement is unenforceable where the agreement evidences nothing
more that an intention to negotiate in the future."
In Carmon v. Soleh Boneh Ltd., 614 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Div.
1994) (citations omitted), the court stated:
It is well settled that an agreement to agree, in which material
terms are left for future negotiations, is unenforceable unless a
methodology for determining the material terms can be found
within the four corners of the agreement or the agreement refers
to an objective extrinsic event, condition, or standard by which
the material teruis may be determined.
The court did not discuss an implied duty to negotiate in good faith.
In Danton Constr. Corp. v. Bonner, 571 N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (App.
Div. 1991), the court held that an option to purchase real property was
an unenforceable agreement to agree, because the agreement specified
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that one party reserved the right to "reformat" the terms to maximize
potential tax advantages.
A letter of intent concerning the formation of a joint venture to
develop property was at issue in Bernstein v. Felske, 533 N.Y.S.2d 538,
539 (App. Div. 1988). The letter of intent identified material terms that
would be resolved and addressed in the definitive documentation and
specified that it would cease to be binding unless a formal contract was
executed by a specified date. Id. The court held that the letter of intent
did not impose on the parties even a duty to negotiate in good faith,
because no objective standards for that conduct were specified in the
letter. Id. at 540.
Professor Shell refers to the unenforceability of agreements to nego-
tiate as being the traditional rule. G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and
Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause
of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 243 (1991). Some earlier cases are col-
lected in Temkin, supra note 73, at 140 n.66. The cases cited in this
footnote 91 are related to cases in which an agreement provides for pos-
sible extension on terms subject to future negotiation, with no express
grant of a right of first offer and with no restriction on the future terms.
Some courts have held that such a provision is not binding. E.g., Muscle
Shoals Aviation, Inc. v. Muscle Shoals Airport Auth., 508 So. 2d 225, 228
(Ala. 1987); Air Host Cedar Rapids, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Airport
Comm'n, 464 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa 1990); cf Ohio Calculating, Inc. v.
CPT Corp., 846 F.2d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding unenforceable
under Minnesota law a paragraph in a dealership agreement that re-
quired the manufacturer to negotiate to purchase the dealer's business
should the dealership be terminated); Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 243-
44 (stating that parties renegotiating an existing agreement are obligated
to negotiate in good faith). For example, in Yan's Video, Inc. v. Hong
Kong TV Video Programs, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144-45 (App. Div.
1987), the court held that a contract that set forth a licensor's "intention
to negotiate in good faith a renewal 'upon terms and conditions to be
negotiated,'" id. at 144 (quoting the agreement in part), was an unen-
forceable agreement to agree. Id. at 145. The original licensee's position
was particularly strong, as it appears that the licensor licensed the prop-
erty to a third party, for a term commencing upon the expiration of the
original license, prior to any contact with the original licensee. See id. at
144.
The language of these decisions is at times confusing, because some
state that such a contract is unenforceable unless it states all material
terms. E.g., Heritage Broadcasting, 428 N.W.2d at 787. Yet inclusion of
the term "agreement to agree," without additional description, to catego-
rize an agreement as unenforceable is ambiguous absent any indication
whether the open issues are limited to material matters.
Where the agreement is subject to the statute of frauds, more defi-
niteness may be required. See, e.g., Schwanbeck, 592 N.E.2d at 1293-94.
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agreements may be binding obligations as to their subject
matter.92 In some jurisdictions, agreements to negotiate in
good faith may be the basis for liability on an alternative theo-
ry of promissory estoppel, even if a contract action is not avail-
able (because such a contract is not enforceable in the jurisdic-
tion or because the facts do not establish the existence of a
contract)."3 Other jurisdictions hold that preliminary agree-
ments may, either expressly or by implication, create an en-
forceable contractual obligation to negotiate."
92. See supra note 73.
93. Newport, 6 F.3d at 1068-69 (construing Louisiana law); see Budget
Mktg., Inc. v. Centronics Corp., 927 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir. 1991) (con-
struing Iowa law, where the facts did not establish the existence of a
contract), judgment on remand affd, 979 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1992); Arca-
dian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 73 (to the same effect under New York
law); Skycom, 813 F.2d at 817 (construing Wisconsin law, not clearly
stating whether a contract action on an agreement to negotiate would be
enforceable); cf Hansen, 487 N.W.2d at 927 n.1 (stating that while under
state law an agreement to negotiate is not enforceable, liability on a
theory of promissory estoppel could not be rejected, although that theory
was not asserted by the parties).
Still other courts will not permit such a recovery. See generally
Temkin, supra note 73, at 143-47 (discussing promissory estoppel in this
context, concluding that most courts have rejected the theory). For exam-
ple, Murray v. At Associates, 18 F.3d 1376, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994) (con-
struing Illinois law), involved an executed Proposed Term Sheet concern-
ing a corporation's formation of a new subsidiary. The term sheet stated,
"Unless the definitive Agreements are executed and delivered . . . [by a
set deadline,] neither party shall have further rights against the other,
excepting existing agreements of employment. .. ." Id. Although the
deadline passed without execution of a definitive agreement, and the
corporation's board had voted not to proceed under the Proposed Term
Sheet, the parties continued to work for three years to establish the
business the subsidiary would have conducted. Id. at 1377-78. In holding
against the plaintiff-employee, the court stated:
Although [the plaintiff-employee] insists that [the defendant]
pledged to work in good faith toward establishing [a new subsid-
iary], and that [the defendant] did not (and never intended to)
do so, we have concluded that Illinois does not permit recovery
under the banner of fraud for promises to negotiate a contract.
Id at 1379.
94. See Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72; A/S Apothekernes, 873
F.2d at 158 (7th Cir. 1989) (Illinois law); Channel Home Ctrs., 795 F.2d
at 299 ("Although no Pennsylvania court has considered whether an
[Vol.48:161
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Cases holding that an obligation to negotiate in good faith is
enforceable have been criticized on the basis that the contours
of such an obligation are difficult to define.9 Yet some readily
agreement to negotiate in good faith may meet these condi-
tions[-whether both parties have manifested an intention to be bound
and whether the terms are sufficiently definite to be specifically en-
forced-]the jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that
such an agreement, if otherwise meeting the requisites of a contract, is
an enforceable contract. We are satisfied that Pennsylvania would follow
this rule.") (citations omitted); Chase v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 744
F.2d 566, 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984) (construing Illinois law); Atlantic Com-
puter Sys., 154 B.R. at 170; Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498-99; Quake
Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 1007 (Stamos, J., specially concurring) (stating
that a letter might be viewed as "only binding the parties to efforts at
achieving a construction contract on the terms outlined" (citing Evans,
Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1976))). But see
Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 264 ("Courts have often balked at enforc-
ing agreements to negotiate even if the parties have made it clear that
they want to subject themselves to this regime."). See generally Temkin,
supra note 73, at 147-53 (arguing that this theory is preferable to prom-
issory estoppel).
95. E.g., Klein, supra note 82, at 158-59. But see Farnsworth, supra
note 73, at 267-69 (rejecting that criticism); Temkin, supra note 73, at
153-61 (favorably discussing such a duty to negotiate). See generally
Milex Prods., Inc. v. Alra Lab., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 1226, 1234 (InI. App. Ct.
1992) (stating that the contours of the duty "can only be determined . . .
from the terms of the letter of intent itself"), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d
515 (111. 1993).
This contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith is distinguish-
able from the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in all
contracts. Channel Home Ctrs., 795 F.2d at 299 n.8; cf Johnson, supra
note 78, at 945-46 (stating the proposition less definitively). But cf Coax-
ial Communications, 807 F. Supp. at 1159 (stating that the implied cove-
nants of good faith apply to a binding contract to negotiate); Nicola W.
Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotia-
tions, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 75, 106-07 (1993) (stating that there is
a duty of good faith prior to contract formation). Those implied obliga-
tions have been described as turning on whether the parties "would have
agreed to proscribe the act later complained of. . . had they thought to
negotiate with respect to that matter." Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d
873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986); Charny, supra note 21, at 1816 (quoting Katz).
Yet the covenants are applied in a more limited manner than this lan-
guage may suggest. See Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual
Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34
J.L. & ECON. 645, 657 (1991) (stating that the covenants do not create
separate substantive rights); cf Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the
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identifiable conduct is clearly inconsistent with negotiating in
good faith.96 Examples of such conduct include the following:
attempting to renegotiate previously agreed terms or adding
other terms of the same magnitude as those addressed in the
preliminary document;97 raising additional material issues as
a pretext;98 and engaging in simultaneous, undisclosed discus-
sions with another party concerning a mutually exclusive
transaction.9 Subsequent acceptance of an alternative real-
izing substantially greater consideration also offers evidence of
a motive suggesting that a party may have failed to negotiate
in good faith. 100
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. In FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., the
Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 619 ("Scholarship ad-
dressed to the good faith provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
primarily discusses the intractable difficulty of defining the scope of the
obligation to perform and enforce one's contract in good faith.") (footnotes
omitted).
96. These and other factors are discussed in 1 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 72, § 3.26c.
97. Milex Products, 603 N.E.2d at 1234 (considering negotiations gov-
erned by the UCC); see Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 506 (holding that the
breaching party's insistence on a condition not within the scope of the
original agreement was not excused by the existence of other open
points); cf Gillette, supra note 95, at 628 ("In one series of cases, courts
have used the good faith clause [implied in contracts] to prevent obligors
from altering situations that they lulled obligees into believing would
remain constant."); Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 280-81. But see
Bernstein, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (holding that there was no implied duty
to negotiate in good faith binding on a party who was to contribute prop-
erty to a joint venture contemplated by a letter of intent, even though
that party allegedly raised issues previously decided in the letter of in-
tent after determining that he could secure a better return from the
property by a sale to a third party); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, §
3.26c (stating that parties should be free to make "creative proposals").
98. A/S Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 158.
99. See Butler, 626 F. Supp. at 1232 (citing evidence that a prospec-
tive borrower engaged in negotiations with other lenders shortly after
executing a commitment letter, in an environment of declining interest
rates, in holding that the borrower's agreement to negotiate in good faith
had been violated). But see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.26c;
Farnsworth, supra note 73, at 279 (stating that because parallel negotia-
tions are common and important, they are permissible absent an express
understanding of exclusivity).
100. Temkin, supra note 73, at 142.
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court of appeals noted its understanding that W.R. Grace's
position was that it had no duty to disclose the omitted infor-
mation on the following basis:
Continental had made a firm commitment by April 7 (if not
earlier)-a commitment that it could not have backed out of
even if Grace had come to it on May 8 and told it that the
Loch Ness monster had swallowed the entire state of Missis-
sippi .... If the commitment was that firm, the fraud was
immaterial."'
The issue was framed in that fashion at the district court,
which stated:
It would appear therefore that the best that could be said
in behalf of Grace is that the commitment letter was ambigu-
ous and the intent as to whether the commitment letter was
binding as of [the date it was executed], or as amended sub-
sequently... , was a question of fact that was properly left
to the jury to decide. The jury was instructed by the court
that "the borrower's duty to disclose ceases when a bank is
obligated to lend the money." The jury obviously decided that
the parties did not intend to enter into a binding commitment
prior to the time that Grace learned of the bad news.'
On appeal, the court of appeals stated:
The only question for us is whether the agreement was so
plainly a commitment by Continental to make a nonrecourse
loan of $75 million to Grace come what may that the jury
would have been irrational to find that Grace's failure to
inform Continental about the disaster that befell [one of the
fields] was material. This we cannot say. The jury was enti-
tled to conclude that the commitment fee (a modest one-half
of one percent per annum on the unused portion of the
loan ... ) was to compensate Continental for agreeing to
make the loan at the agreed interest rate, and other terms
and conditions, provided nothing new and material came to
light between the commitment and the closing."°8
101. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 620.
102. FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 93 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1056 (1990).
103. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 622.
1995]
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The district court's jury instruction improperly framed the
issue for the jury, and the court of appeals misstated the im-
port of the jury verdict. The preceding discussion"' demon-
strates that the law applicable to preliminary instruments does
not create a binary framework in which the agreement either
reflects a binding understanding addressing all issues or is an
unenforceable manifestation of intent. In many jurisdictions, a
preliminary instrument may instead create a wide array of
relationships, in which some issues are resolved in a binding
fashion, coupled with either an implied or an express obliga-
tion to negotiate the remaining issues in good faith. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing Illinois law, has
indicated that such an agreement is enforceable. Three months
before the court of appeals decided FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
another panel of the same court stated:
The district court nonetheless concluded that the ... letter of
intent did impose upon the parties an obligation to negotiate
in good faith. We agree that conclusion was proper; a number
of courts, including this court, have held that the terms of a
letter of intent may impose such a duty.'
A letter of intent may create a duty to negotiate, even if
such an undertaking is not express.0 ' Conflicting precedents
exist in the Seventh Circuit concerning whether letters of in-
tent create such a duty under Illinois law. Language in an
opinion of the Seventh Circuit issued shortly before FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co. suggests that, as of that time, such an obli-
gation arose only as a result of an express undertaking.
10 7
Nevertheless, an opinion written by Judge Posner a few years
before FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. indicates that a preliminary
letter outlining the terms of a transaction may create a duty to
104. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
105. A/S Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 158 (construing Illinois law).
106. See Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 499 (holding such an agreement
existed, without identifying any express agreement to negotiate in the
letter of intent).
107. A/S Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 159. A detailed collection of Illinois
case law on precontractual liability is contained in Johnson, supra note
78.
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negotiate in good faith, even where the letter does not express
such a duty. In Chase v. Consolidated Foods Corp., he wrote:
[I]f the jury had thought that [the prospective seller] had
stopped negotiating with [the prospective purchaser] after
[the date of the letter of intent] merely because [the prospec-
tive seller] had decided it wanted to keep [the division to be
sold] after all, the jury could readily have concluded that [the
prospective seller] had violated a binding commitment in the
[letter of intent]: a commitment to negotiate in good faith for
the sale of [the division] to [the prospective purchaser]. As to
that promise, the agreement-though merely a letter of in-
tent-was (if the parties intended) an enforceable con-
tract. 8
The facts unambiguously support the existence of some form
of binding contract in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. Under the
commitment letter, W.R. Grace was obligated to pay Continen-
tal Illinois $375,000 per year if no funds were drawn on the
loan facility. °9 W.R. Grace did not agree to pay this fee with-
out expecting some benefit in return. The question for the jury
was what type of obligation had been created. The jury instruc-
tion quoted above did not permit the jury to consider whether
the commitment letter in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. created a
binding agreement under which Continental Illinois was obli-
gated to negotiate a definitive loan agreement, addressing
issues other than the agreed adequacy of the collateral's val-
ue." ° Moreover, the facts were sufficient for a court to hold,
as a matter of law, that the agreement formed by the commit-
ment letter did not permit Continental Illinois to revisit the
108. Chase, 744 F.2d at 571 (construing Illinois law).
109. See WR. Grace, 877 F.2d at 622. The commitment fee consisted of
"one-half of one percent per annum on the unused portion of the loan."
Id.
110. Agreements creating a loan facility, such as the one at issue in
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., that contemplate drawings after their execu-
tion will specify conditions to the borrower's ability to draw on the fa-
cility that must be satisfied as of the time funds are drawn. The jury
instructions are ambiguous as to their application to such conditions
unrelated to the collateral's value. With those instructions, a jury may
well have found for Continental Illinois even if a typical loan agreement
had been in effect as of the time adverse information concerning the
fields became available.
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sufficiency of the collateral.
Subsequent events and actions may be considered as evi-
dence of the parties' understanding of the relationship created
by a commitment letter."' Continental Illinois did not secure
in the definitive loan agreement a representation concerning
adverse developments affecting the collateral's value."' Con-
tinental Illinois' failure to obtain such a representation, or to
undertake its own inquiry, strongly supports the conclusion
that Continental Illinois did not believe that the sufficiency of
the collateral remained negotiable."'
The court in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. therefore should
have considered whether, as of the time the commitment letter
was issued, an intermediate agreement had been reached.
Such an agreement may have consisted of an understanding as
111. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, § 3.8, at 184; see Newport, 6 F.3d
at 1065 (citing subsequent conduct in holding, under Louisiana law, that
a reasonable person could find that the parties intended to be bound);
Computer Sys., 795 F.2d at 1090-91 (citing that, after execution of a
preliminary letter, "both parties acted as if they were contractually
bound," as evidence that a contract was formed); Channel Home Ctrs.,
795 F.2d at 299-300 (citing subsequent actions in holding that the record
supported a finding that an agreement was intended to constitute a bind-
ing agreement to negotiate in good faith); Sand Creek Country Club, 582
N.E.2d at 875 (citing that the client of an architectural firm, whose ser-
vices were the subject of a preliminary letter, subsequently asked for an
invoice to be sent, as evidence that the preliminary letter contemplated
payment for services rendered regardless of the failure to execute a sub-
sequent definitive agreement); Vickery v. Walton, 533 N.E.2d 1381, 1382
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (stating in respect of a written offer to purchase
residential real estate, "Whether a preliminary agreement which contem-
plates execution of a further document represents an understanding of
the parties on all essential terms cannot be read from the text of the
preliminary paper alone. The provisions of the subsequent agreement, or
subsequent events, may expose disagreement between the parties about
significant business terms.").
112. See Loan Agreement, supra note 59, at 6-8. Had such a represen-
tation been secured, the case would have been straightforward-W.R.
Grace's actions would have violated the representation, and discussion of
the relationship created by the commitment letter would have been moot.
113. But see Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain
Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 65, 80-83 (1994) (arguing that upon delivery of the commitment letter,
the parties progressed from arm's length bargaining to a cooperative
relationship requiring disclosure).
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to the collateral's sufficiency and certain other terms, and a
commitment to negotiate remaining terms.
Judge Posner states that it would have been unreasonable
for Continental Illinois to have entered into such an agree-
ment, because such a provision would make Continental Illi-
nois "in effect the fire insurer of the [collateral]."' He there-
fore concludes that the commitment letter should not be con-
strued as unambiguously consisting of a definitive agreement
concerning the value of the collateral."5 This language mis-
states the relationship because only part of the purchase price
was financed."' If the collateral had been damaged, W.R.
Grace would have had no first-order incentive to proceed with
the transaction, unless W.R. Grace already had been under a
binding obligation to do so or unless W.R. Grace would receive
insurance proceeds, not subject to the lien of the loan agree-
ment. If, as of the time the commitment letter was issued,
W.R. Grace itself had not committed with the seller as to the
value of the collateral, Continental Illinois could have rational-
ly relied on W.R. Grace's self-interest in respect of the
unfinanced portion of the purchase price to assure that the
transaction did not close if events adversely affecting the col-
lateral arose."7
W.R. Grace ultimately received $13 million from the seller of
the interest in settlement of a claim for failure to disclose in-
formation concerning the fields."' One might well have ex-
114. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 622.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 616, 618 (noting that the loan was for $75 million,
whereas the purchase price was $87 million).
117. The extent to which an investment having two or more possible
returns is financed on a non-recourse basis may change whether the
investment is profitable, on an expected value basis, by allocating some
of the risk onto the lender in the case of a bad outcome. See WILLIAM A.
KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 226-28 (3d ed. 1988). Thus, the extent
to which W.R. Grace expected to receive a settlement from the seller, not
subject to the lien of the loan, effectively increased the financed portion,
with a corresponding second-order effect on return. Although this fact
suggests that Continental Illinois should have had concerns about the
potential for non-parallel incentives, it does not mean that relying on
W.R. Grace's self-interest in the period from commitment to closing would
have been irrational.
118. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 618. The opinion does not analyze the
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pected Continental Illinois to provide that its security interest
extended to all rights owing to W.R. Grace in respect of its
purchase of the interest in the fields, including this settlement.
Continental Illinois' failure to require these contractual provi-
sions may reflect a failure to obtain perfect legal advice, but it
does not make W.R. Grace a tortfeasor.
Commitment letters may form binding agreements, notwith-
standing the expectation that further refinements of the con-
tractual relationship are forthcoming. It would not have been
irrational for Continental Illinois to have agreed in the com-
mitment letter to the sufficiency of the collateral's value. Con-
tinental Illinois' own actions are consistent with its having
reached such an understanding. Allowing a jury to decide that
Continental Illinois had reserved the issue permitted Conti-
nental Illinois' assignee, the FDIC, to try to secure latitude in
court that Continental Illinois declined, or failed, to secure it-
self when it had the opportunity to do so.
C. Defaults in Contract Law
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. The court invoked economic theo-
ry in deciding the second fundamental legal issue in FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co., the borrower's duty to disclose.119 In doing
so, it ignored the absence of facts to support assumptions nec-
essary for the valid application of the theory. To determine
what assumptions underlie the applied economic theory, the
basis for the theory itself should be examined in depth. This
analysis begins with the opinion, where the court stated:
terms of the contract under which W.R. Grace purchased the interest.
The opinion does not clarify whether W.R. Grace had an insurable inter-
est in the fields at the time the commitment letter was executed. If so,
and risk of loss from injury to the fields had passed to W.R. Grace,
Continental Illinois perhaps should have required an insurance policy in
whose proceeds it had a security interest.
119. The opinion indicates that this part of FDIC v. WR. Grace & Co.
is dicta. Id. at 620. This aspect of the case was cited with approval in
AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041
(7th Cir. 1990), it appears, as supporting by analogy the proposition that
parties to a contract are required to provide a "minimum of cooperative-
ness in the event unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage."
That citation implies that the Seventh Circuit, in applying Illinois law, is
following the dictates of this portion of FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co.
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The seller who deals at arm's length is entitled to "take ad-
vantage" of the buyer at least to the extent of exploiting in-
formation and expertise that the seller expended substantial
resources of time or money on obtaining--otherwise what
incentive would there be to incur such costs? But when the
seller has without substantial investment on his part come
upon material information which the buyer would find either
impossible or very costly to discover himself, then the seller
must disclose it-for example, must disclose that the house
he is trying to sell is infested with termites.120
A citation to the first of the two sentences in Judge Posner's
opinion quoted above refers to an article by Professor Kronman
published in 1978.121 That article states:
If the parties to a contract are acting rationally, they will
minimize the joint costs of a potential mistake by assigning
the risk of its occurrence to the party who is the better
(cheaper) information-gatherer. Where the parties have actu-
ally assigned the risk-whether explicitly, or implicitly
through their adherence to trade custom and past patterns of
dealing-their own allocation must be respected. Where they
have not-and there is a resulting gap in the contract-a
court concerned with economic efficiency should impose the
risk on the better information-gatherer. This is so for familiar
reasons: by allocating the risk in this way, an efficiency-
minded court reduces the transaction costs of the contracting
process itself.122
Professor Kronman concludes that there is a right not to dis-
close where "the information is the result of a deliberate and
costly search."" A footnote in his article states:
Whether such a gap exists will depend upon the intentions of
the parties as reconstructed by a process of judicial interpre-
120. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 619 (citations omitted). The use of the
term "seller" in this quoted language may be confusing. The court proper-
ly viewed the borrowers under a non-recourse loan as being in a position
similar to that of a party selling an interest in the collateral.
121. Id. (citing, without specific page references, Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1978)).
122. Kronman, supra note 121, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 33.
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tation. The fact that a contract does not cover a particular
point explicitly does not mean that the parties failed to reach
an understanding with respect to the point in question. Only
if no such understanding exists can the contract be said to
contain a genuine gap or lacuna.12
Kronman's article has been frequently cited with approval by
both commentators and courts," and it therefore presents a
vehicle for discussion of a quantitative analysis that has affect-
ed identifiable adjudicated issues. The extent to which any
choice of a default rule may realize efficiency gains is discussed
in this subpart III.C. Subpart III.D then reexamines default
rules and their assumptions in the particular context of disclo-
sure obligations, such as those at issue in FDIC v. W.R. Grace
&Co.
Efficient Defaults. The quoted portions of Professor
Kronman's article reflect traditional economic theory. The
concept is that there is some method of generally allocating
risks between contracting parties that contracting parties ordi-
narily will prefer-one that maximizes the joint value of the
transaction. The scheme Professor Kronman identifies allo-
cates the risk to the better information-gatherer. If this rule is
one that parties ordinarily would select, then choosing as the
default the risk allocation that is consistent with this goal
putatively minimizes transaction costs. The assumption is that
parties not represented by counsel will have faith that the law
will imply reasonable terms, and therefore the parties will not
undertake the process of obtaining legal counsel. Alternatively,
for parties represented by counsel, the assumption is that
counsel avoid the costs of specifying, and perhaps entering into
negotiations that would nevertheless arrive at, the default
rules.
Professor Kronman's analysis assumes that informed, ratio-
nal parties who actually negotiate will ordinarily allocate risks
in the fashion he proposes. Yet this assumption does not reflect
actual transactional practice in large, complex transactions.
Large, complex transactions are frequently negotiated through
124. Id. at 4 n.7 (emphasis added).
125. Robert L. Birmingham, The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner's
Dilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 249, 251 (1988).
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sequential steps, commencing with basic financial terms and
progressing to increasingly technical details.12 Letters of in-
tent are a part of that process, fixing certain terms, particular-
ly financial terms, before other details are addressed. The sub-
sequent decisions on details frequently do not affect pricing,
because it is not practical to reduce alternative resolutions to
dollar terms and because the complexity of the transaction
causes parties not to reopen previously agreed terms. These
factors, which restrict the reduction of legal issues to quantita-
tive terms, permit resolutions to be reached that others might
characterize as unstable. When lawyers negotiate these details,
they are thus in the position of attempting to obtain the most
advantageous arrangements for their clients, independent of
the joint values. Lawyers negotiating these details may refer to
"joint maximization" in an attempt to obtain benefits for their
clients. Lawyers may, however, refer to any other evidence
that will persuade opposing counsel. Even mundane factors,
such as which counsel is responsible for preparing revised
drafts, affect the results. The ultimate conclusion of actual
bargaining therefore need not reflect a "joint maximization"
resolution.
If actual parties would not adopt a rule that is asserted to be
"efficient," some commentators would nevertheless assert that
the default should be the efficient rule. Professor Craswell
states, "[E]conomists are not committed to the idea that the
law should replicate whatever terms actual parties would have
agreed to ex ante, even when those terms would have been
inefficient."1"7 Yet Professor Kronman justifies his rule on the
basis of avoiding transaction costs." Specifying a rule that
parties "should" choose as the default, as opposed to the rule
they would choose, will cause knowledgeable parties to enter
the negotiations Professor Kronman seeks to avoid.
Moreover, difficult questions concerning the extent to which
the hypothetical bargain incorporates attributes of the particu-
lar transaction in question and the particular parties are in-
herent." Although Professor Charny has attempted to pro-
126. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
127. Richard Craswell, Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contractu-
al Settings, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 805, 829 (1992).
128. Kronman, supra note 121, at 3-5.
129. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
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vide an analysis of the proper extent of incorporation of the
parties' and the transaction's characteristics, 3 ' there is no
clear consensus concerning the level of generality to be used
with respect to both the parties and the transaction. 3' Even
if one assumes that Professor Kronman has identified the eco-
nomic rationale that supports the efficient risk allocation,
which is not free from dispute in the literature,32 the bene-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989)
(discussing defaults that they name "tailored" and "untailored"); Charny,
supra note 21, at 1820-21 (identifying a two-dimensional question of de-
grees of "generality" and "idealization"); Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
597, 606-08 (1990) (discussing whether default rules should reflect the
"particular circumstances and preferences of the parties"); cf Craswell,
supra note 127, at 821 (arguing that the hypothetical bargain standard is
a shorthand for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). The Kaldor-Hicks test identifies
as efficient a change in which the gains to onb party are sufficient so
that he could cause the other party to be indifferent to the transaction
by remitting a portion of his gains to the other party. See id. at 807-08;
Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclo-
sure, 41 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 329, 336 n.41 (1991). There are well-
known objections to this criterion, on the basis that it does not consider
distributional equity. See Charny, supra note 21, at 1869.
130. Charny, supra note 21, at 1844-47.
131. See generally id. at 1822-23 (discussing the alternative approaches
of Justice Traynor and Judge Kozinski).
132. For example, Professors Ayres and Gertner have argued that, in
at least some circumstances, the law should provide "penalty defaults."
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 129, at 91. In their view, in some circum-
stances, such rules may perform an educational role, by alerting one
party to the legal issue in question. Id. at 98. As an example, they cite
a default under which real estate brokers receive no portion of a deposit
forfeited by the purchaser. Id. at 98-99. They also cite Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), under which the default
limits consequential damages to those that are foreseeable. Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 129, at 101-04. In their view, this default forces
parties shipping property to identify themselves if they would incur ex-
traordinary consequential damages in the event of breach. Id. at 102.
Recently, Professors Ayres and Gertner have argued that, particu-
larly where the parties possess asymmetric information, it is extremely
difficult to determine which rule is efficient. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE L.J. 729, 765 (1992). That concern is consistent with the other
arguments presented in this Article. Ayres and Gertner also discuss de-
faults in the context where one party has market power. Id. at 73546.
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fits of choosing this default are uncertain. Alternative ratio-
nales are proposed as being the efficient choice, which suggests
that the benefits of any particular choice of a default will be
offset, to some extent, by the failure to follow other "efficient"
rationales.
Contractual Abstraction. Separate from the concerns that the
benefits of Professor Kronman's approach are ephemeral are
the costs that arise from an attempt actually to implement the
approach. Various aspects of the law regulating corporate and
finance practice, and finance practice itself, reflect recognition
of the value of abstraction. The corporate form can provide
value where a corporation's creditors cannot feasibly weigh the
solvency of the corporation's shareholders and therefore cannot
compensate for the right to pursue claims against sharehold-
ers. In such a context, the corporate form creates an aggregate
increase in wealth by limiting creditors' claims to the assets of
the corporation. The same notion underlies the explosive
growth of structured finance, in which a corporation can segre-
gate its assets into discrete segments subject to separate re-
view." These circumstances are two well-known examples of
contexts in which the actual costs to pursue full discovery and
disclosure of relevant facts are acknowledged to be too expen-
sive to warrant the benefits.
A less prominent, but established and more extreme, exam-
ple is provided by 11 U.S.C. § 1110.1' This provision ex-
empts, inter alia, aircraft under lease or subject to a security
interest from the automatic stay of bankruptcy." This ex-
emption permits an airline to separate its aircraft from the
financial risks of the airline as a whole. The definiteness
granted to lenders, decreasing the uncertainty of the effect of
Yet default rules derived from analyses of participants with market pow-
er are not necessarily applicable where that power is not present.
Other competing rationales relating particularly to the duty to dis-
close are discussed infra at notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
133. See Stephen I. Glover, Structured Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset
Securitization by Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAW. 611, 618 (1992);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize As-
sets, 11 CARDOZo L. REV. 607, 608 (1990).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).
135. Id. § 1110(a).
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insolvency of the debtor, creates greater access to capital for
airlines at a lower interest rate.136
After the fact, of course, it may be in one party's interest to
argue that the information intentionally not pursued should
have been disclosed. The creditor of an insolvent corporation
nevertheless may attempt ex post to bring an action against
shareholders. Where the original abstraction is efficient, recog-
nition of subsequent attempts to violate the abstraction is not
efficient. A legal system attempting to encourage efficiency in
such contexts would not recognize or reward ex post attempts
to abrogate abstraction created by contract.
The value of abstraction---of providing certainty in contrac-
tual relationships-is also reflected in other contractual ar-
rangements. In some circumstances, parties to a contract only
briefly set forth the terms of their arrangement. Yet in other
cases, the parties attempt to specify fully their relationship.
For example, the Model Simplified Indenture, a model form
bond indenture, consists of thirty-seven printed pages. 7
Loan agreements, merger agreements and other acquisition
agreements also are often comparably lengthy. The parties'
objectives in entering into such an agreement may include a
desire to provide certainty at the time the contract is executed
or to provide certainty at some time in the future, when unpre-
dicted or unspecified circumstances arise.
These lengthy agreements reflect the parties' attempts to
specify fully their relationship. The negotiation of such docu-
ments can be a lengthy, costly process. The participants spend
the time and money to generate full documents when they
believe that providing certainty is to their ultimate benefit."3
In considering the analyses of others who purport to propose
an efficient default rule, whether parties are permitted con-
tractually to adopt efficient abstraction must be considered. If
136. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1991).
137. Model Simplified Indenture, reprinted in 38 Bus. LAw. 741 (1983).
138. Cf PSI Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 17 F.3d 969, 974
(7th Cir.) ("Contracts allocate risks, and judicial reallocation interferes
with not only negotiation but also the economic processes the contracts
govern. By enforcing contractual language rather than molding it until
the outcome looks more fair ex post, courts in the end serve all con-
tracting parties' interests."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2712 (1994).
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a framework does not recognize contractual abstraction, the
framework is not efficient unless the efficiency gains proposed
by the framework exceed the losses arising from the failure to
recognize contractually-created abstraction.
The fundamental problem with Professor Kronman's frame-
work, which purports to realize efficiency gains, is that, as
applied in practice, it does not permit a participant to opt out
of the default with certainty. Professor Goetz and Dean Scott,
in discussing incomplete contracts, state, "When a contract
fails to provide for a contingency, unintended results may
occur.... Note that contractual instructions, although incom-
plete, may nonetheless specify a perfectly well-defined and
clear result for each contingency .... 139
This aspect of these frameworks has substantial implica-
tions. A contract will not be considered to have opted out of a
default-to have completely specified the contractual relation-
ship-unless the contract identifies in detail the particular
factual pattern that ultimately arises. For example, Dean Scott
discusses a case in which an express escalation clause was
held not to specify fully the scope of the intended escalation,
because an oil embargo affected certain relevant costs to an
extent greater than was reflected in the escalation clause.140
Likewise, Professor Charny asserts that a contract did not pro-
vide the extent of one party's obligations to another, and had a
gap, because the contract did not expressly negate the exis-
tence of any implied duty in the particular context.' He
states, "[Olne should determine whether the term is 'express'
by deciding whether it indicates a conscious decision of the
parties about their duties under the contingency now at issue,
139. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 270 (1985).
140. Scott, supra note 129, at 602-05 (discussing Aluminum Co. of Am.
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)).
141. Charny, supra note 21, at 1833. He discusses whether a corpora-
tion had an implied duty to an employee, not negated by an express
employment contract, to abstain from firing the employee in order to
prevent the employee from receiving gains in connection with an unan-
nounced merger. One surmises that the gain would derive from an in-
crease in value of stock owned by the employee, which the employee was
required to forfeit or otherwise transfer upon termination of employment.
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for it is to the overriding of this choice that the antipaternalist
objects.
This test effectively prevents parties from creating a contract
that the parties know, with certainty, overrides contractual de-
faults. As the defaults become increasingly complex, where the
standard of determining whether a gap exists in a contract is
based on whether the contract expressly negates the default
rules as applied to a particular factual pattern, it becomes
impossible for a transactional lawyer to draft specific contract
provisions sufficient to override the default.' Moreover,
where large groups of conscientious lawyers attempt to over-
ride a default, the uniformity of their response may cause a
court to characterize the drafting as "boilerplate," and hold the
provisions not to be enforceable strictly in accordance with
their terms. 4
Of the commentaries discussed above, none attempts to
balance the putative efficiency gains against the costs of pre-
venting efficient contractual abstraction. These costs and bene-
fits are difficult to quantify. "5 Yet absent that quantification,
142. Id.
143. Cf. Scott, supra note 129, at 611 (arguing that complex defaults
decrease the certainty with which participants can predict the default's
application to a particular factual pattern).
144. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at 314-15 (discussing merger
clauses).
145. Cf Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the
Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 158-59 (1982) (acknowledging the
difficulty in measuring inefficiencies and injustices of competing schemes).
An additional problem is that requiring detailed specification of
potential circumstances may actually inhibit contract formation. The mere
raising of certain issues by one party may cause the other party to draw
improper conclusions. For example, a participant asked to provide infor-
mation concerning his assets available in the event of non-performance,
which might be manifested in inquiries concerning corporate structure,
may conclude that the other participant is likely to be confrontational
and litigious, which may ultimately derail a mutually beneficial
transaction. One skill practicing lawyers attempt to develop, with varying
degrees of success, is the ability to raise potentially controversial issues
in a manner that does not incite an adverse response. Adverse effects
may be minimized by judicious, i.e., indirect, drafting of contract lan-
guage. Although counsel can attempt to minimize these adverse effects,
they cannot be eliminated. Any rule requiring specific contractual lan-
guage proposed in the pursuit of efficiency exacerbates these other prob-
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those commentaries are merely heuristic.
If any advantages are to be achieved by selecting an efficient
default rule, it is necessary to segregate its application to cir-
cumstances where the parties have not intended to adopt con-
tractual abstraction. Two indications that the parties have
intended to adopt contractual abstraction are that the parties
have set forth a lengthy agreement and that the parties have
specified in great detail a portion of the relationship. Where
such an agreement on its face is not only complete but also
contains detailed provisions, such as a bond indenture or an
acquisition agreement, the effect of upholding efficient abstrac-
tion would be to limit representations to the express represen-
tations and to limit a party's obligations to those that are ex-
pressed. The length of such a negotiated agreement evidences
the parties' intent to express fully their relationship. When the
parties make such an effort, to those concerned with efficiency,
abstraction must reject any attempt to raise an issue of the
type expressly addressed in the contract. Rational participants
do not expend the effort to create lengthy contracts articulating
a relationship, only to delegate to a court the power to refor-
mulate the arrangement.
More difficult is to decide whether a court should hold that
there is an unarticulated exception to an express representa-
tion or obligation. " ' Nevertheless, absent an event truly ex-
traordinary in both its type and its effect, contractual abstrac-
tion is prevented by permitting a court to create exceptions in
the face of comprehensive, absolute contractual language. In
complex transactions, a party who wishes to raise an issue but
expects that he will not prevail in negotiation may well remain
silent to retain the ability to litigate ex post. Only a stern rule
of construction can permit the parties to bind themselves not
to act in this fashion.
An inquiry into rules of construction as applied to a type of
contract invariably negotiated by represented parties reflects
judicial recognition of the value of not implying rights or du-
lems and will inhibit contract formation in many contexts.
146. Professor Farnsworth has previously distinguished between creat-
ing unidentified duties and creating exceptions to otherwise absolute
contractual language. E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in
Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 860, 886 (1968).
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ties. Delaware courts strictly construe the scope of contractual
obligations under a corporation's securities; the courts are
quite reluctant to imply rights not expressly set forth in the
documents.147
This discussion does not suggest that permitting contractual
abstraction requires an unrelenting, literal interpretation of
contracts. Exceptions need not be limited to typographical or
similar errors. Efficient abstraction is preserved even where
parties are permitted to argue ex post that the contractual
provisions, as applied to a particular, unusual factual pattern,
produce results that the complaining party can clearly and
convincingly demonstrate are results that no rational parties
would have contemplated ex ante. Paradigmatic is Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. v. Sun Bank,14 in which the express
conversion provisions for convertible bonds, as applied to an
extraordinary distribution, caused the conversion price to be
negative. In the case of convertible bonds, a specified principal
amount of bonds is convertible into that number of shares
equal to the quotient obtained by dividing the aggregate princi-
147. See, e.g., HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., [1993 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,773, at 97,746 (Del. Ch. July 1,
1993) (strictly construing the certificate of designation for preferred stock
in connection with a transaction that allegedly "ha[d] no real purpose
other than the avoidance of the rights of . . . preferred stockholders");
Glinert v. Wickes Cos., No. 10,407 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 1990), reprinted in
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 764, 775-80 (1991) (strictly construing a warrant
agreement in connection with a reclassification followed by a merger),
affd, 586 A.2d 1201 (Del. 1990); Barry J. Benzing, Commentary, Getting
What You Bargained For: The Contractual Nature of a Preferred
Shareholder's Rights-Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 19
DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 529-30 (1994) ("Courts will continue to construe
the rights, duties, etc., granted in a certificate of designation strictly and
against the benefit of preferred shareholders in the instance of ambigu-
ity."); see also Charny, supra note 21, at 1862 n.160 (noting the impor-
tance of clarity in bond indentures and letters of credit). (The author
participated in the provision of legal services in the transaction at issue
in Glinert.) The value of predictability in those cases is heightened by
the reliance of third parties, investors, on the terms of the instruments
in making investment decisions.
148. No. CI 87-3985, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 25, 1987), avail-
able in part in Mutual Shares Corp. et al., Amendment No. 1 to Sched-
ule 13D Concerning Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. (July 8, 1987).
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pal amount of the bonds being converted by the conversion
price. 4 ' As the conversion price approaches zero from above,
the number of shares into which a specified principal amount
of bonds is convertible becomes infinite. Where the conversion
price becomes negative,5 ° indicating that the holder can de-
liver a negative amount of bonds to the issuer, i.e., receive
bonds from the issuer, and also receive common stock in re-
turn, it is clear that the express contractual provisions reflect
an erroneous contract formulation. Such an agreement should
not be enforced in such a context strictly in accordance with its
terms.
This discussion also does not suggest that competent counsel
always gives perfect legal advice to clients. Counsel may well
not foresee all relevant risks. Counsel recognizing this possibil-
ity may try to insert contractual language that would support
subsequent litigation.' Since the possibility of inaccuracy is
recognizable in advance, this possibility presents no unique
issues. Allowing such less than perfect advice to permit ex post
reallocation prevents contractual abstraction.
This subpart III.C has addressed the benefits of permitting
contractual abstraction in certain complete agreements. For
those same agreements, the advantages to the participants
from selecting an "efficient" default rule are relatively small.
In discrete transactions that are sufficiently large to cause
both parties to retain counsel to document the transaction, the
choice of a default should be irrelevant.'52 For a variety of
149. E.g., Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 137, § 10.01.
150. The conversion price typically is adjusted by various events, which
may include extraordinary dividends. See id. § 10.08. Where an adjust-
ment is made in respect of an extraordinary distribution, the conversion
price typically is decreased by a multiplicative factor equal to the excess
of the current price of the stock over the amount of the distribution as a
fraction of the current market price. To avoid anomalous results arising
from unusual trading on a particular day, the current price of the stock
can be based on the average price over a period of days. The conversion
price could become negative where a trailing average includes a period of
time before the announcement of an extraordinary dividend in which the
stock traded at a price less than the value of the extraordinary dividend.
151. One practitioner, who shall remain anonymous, refers to including
"popcorn" in documents, drawing an image of language exploding under
the heat of litigation.
152. Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 132, at 732 (stating that the
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reasons, it can be very difficult and costly for counsel to deter-
mine with complete assurance which default a court would im-
ply.'53 Moreover, that judicial interpretations change over
time decreases the value of attempts to determine the law with
respect to any particular default. Additionally, prudent lawyers
frequently incorporate terms in a contract for administrative
convenience-to provide in a single document a definitive,
complete reference articulating the parties' rights, obligations
and procedures for conduct."M A prudent practitioner in this
context therefore frequently will not rely on a default to specify
a material undertaking.' Rather, a transactional lawyer will
cause the definitive documentation to reflect the parties' un-
default is irrelevant when it is costless to override the default and both
parties are aware of the default).
153. Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 129, at 118 (stating that a dis-
agreement between Judges Easterbrook and Posner, two learned jurists
with a law and economics approach, concerning a case raising these is-
sues suggests that there are significant risks of judicial error). In fact,
competent lawyers may not know, or care, what default is implied by law
in the particular jurisdiction, since they intend not to rely on the default.
A more relevant concern may be whether the contract is enforceable in
accordance with its terms under the law of the relevant jurisdiction. This
concern is particularly acute when counsel is required to deliver an opin-
ion on the enforceability of the agreement in question. The requirement
to deliver an opinion often is the reason underlying the inclusion of the
otherwise peculiar phrase "to the extent permitted by law" in contract
provisions.
154. Bond indentures are a classic example. Many of the provisions are
incorporated into these indentures as a matter of law from the Trust
Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and
could be omitted or included in a summary form incorporating the re-
quirements of that Act, as contemplated by the Model Simplified Inden-
ture. Prior to a recent amendment to that Act, Trust Indenture Reform
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2721, 2731-32, these provi-
sions could not be omitted, but a summary form was sufficient. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77jjj-77nnn, 77ooo(b) (1988). Still, sophisticated lawyers
frequently expressly set forth these terms to collect those terms for ad-
ministrative convenience, to assure that implied terms do not conflict
with express terms-when the terms that would be implied are expressly
set forth, it is much easier to identify any conflicts-and to reflect a
preference not to rely on a statutory default.
155. But see Charny, supra note 21, at 1820; Craswell, supra note 127,
at 830-31 (discussing an alternative strategy where both parties agree to
rely on a court's specification of the proper rule).
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derstanding, even if the lawyer perceives that the default
would reflect his client's understanding. '"
Dean Scott has persuasively argued that relational con-
tracts, in which the parties will have an ongoing relationship,
may better regulate a relationship in which the parties subse-
quently face numerous unanticipated issues by providing a
nebulous "best efforts" or "reasonable efforts" obligation."7
Yet the existence of that type of transaction does not mean
that contractual abstraction in highly negotiated transactions
should not be respected. In any negotiated transaction, the
parties could expressly state that any express contractual risk
allocation shall be subject to judicial reallocation if reasonable
parties expressly addressing the issue ex ante pursuing a goal
of joint wealth maximization would have provided an alterna-
tive allocation. If sophisticated parties intend to enter such a
relationship, counsel certainly can draft the language. If that is
the test a court could impose, its express articulation should be
enforceable. Since that express contractual allocation is avail-
able, excluding expansive implied duties from highly negotiat-
ed and documented transactions in which detailed contractual
language has been adopted sacrifices no efficiency.
The preceding discussion indicates that the selection of a
default rule cannot be justified as reducing transaction costs of
discrete transactions between represented parties. Choice of a
default rule also does not decrease transaction costs for anoth-
er broad set of transactions: where the sole negotiation of the
non-financial terms is the provision of a form by one party,
156. Professor Charny asserts that no text or language can specify a
meaning without reference to external rules of construction. Charny,
supra note 21, at 1819, 1829. Such puzzles of logic serve merely to dis-
tract from a careful review of the substance of a legal rule.
157. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967,
1024 (1983); Scott, supra note 129, at 604. The prospects of future gains
may cause parties not to act strategically even in the absence of a con-
tract between them. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic
Analysis of the Potential for Coercion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 765-91 (1994) (addressing that possibility in
consent solicitations directed to bondholders); Shell, supra note 91, at
267-71 (1991) (discussing the effect of reputations on opportunistic behav-
ior).
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previously prepared with the benefit of counsel, which is not
the subject of further negotiation. Examples of such agree-
ments are overnight delivery contracts, 5" automobile rental
agreements and apartment leases.159 Some parties do negoti-
ate terms of such contracts. For a vast array of contractual
relationships, however, there is no negotiation at all. In this
circumstance as with discrete transactions between represent-
ed parties, counsel drafting the contract will not rely on the de-
faults provided by law where there is any potential uncertainty
concerning the defaults that will be imposed by courts. In
these relationships, transaction costs arise in providing a con-
tract and, in some circumstances, preparing the form. These
costs do not reflect any negotiation. Thus, in this instance, the
choice of a default rule will have no significant ability to de-
158. Ayres and Gertner note this relationship in their discussion of
default rules. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 129, at 103 n.70. They indi-
cate that the terms for shipment by Federal Express Corporation general-
ly limit consequential damages to $100, subject to increase through insur-
ance at stated rates. Id. That summary does not describe the relationship
created by Federal Express Corporation's current shipping contract. The
present contract provides, "Even if a higher value is declared, [Federal
Express Corporation's] liability for loss, damage or delay will not exceed
a shipment's repair cost, its depreciated value, or its replacement cost,
whichever is less ... ." FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., FEDEX® SERVICE
GUIDE 184 (1995). It further provides, "[Federal Express Corporation]
won't be liable for any damages, whether direct, incidental, special or
consequential, in excess of the declared value of a shipment, whether or
not we knew or should have known that such damages might be in-
curred, including, but not limited to, loss of income or profits." Id. at
189. (Ayres and Gertner refer to an earlier version of Federal Express
Corporation's contract, quoted in part in Richard A. Epstein, Beyond
Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 105, 120 n.40 (1989), which was similar.)
The reasonable import of this language is that consequential damag-
es are limited to the value of the item shipped, even if a higher value is
declared. A contrary construction would directly conflict with the first
quoted sentence. The inaccuracy of the categorization of this relationship
as providing insurance is expressed in the current service guide. The
service guide states, "We do not provide insurance coverage of any kind."
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., supra, at 186.
159. Although landlords may not engage counsel to draft a lease, the
terms of many form leases appear to have been drafted by a lawyer to
replicate the first draft that would be delivered by counsel representing
the landlord.
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crease transaction costs, and the default should not affect the
ultimate contractual allocation.16 °
The foregoing discussion identifies transactions where judi-
cious selection of default rules is of limited value, because such
selection fails to reduce transaction or other costs. Instead of
increasing efficiency, the mechanics of actual practice suggest
that even with an appropriate default, most costs will not be
avoided. Moreover, in those transactions, complex default rules
prevent contractual abstraction when the parties attempt to
specify their arrangement in detail. This discussion calls into
question the value of frameworks proposed without quantifying
or estimating the purported benefits. An understanding of the
actual environment of transactional practice reveals the limits
of these theoretical analyses. Subpart III.D reviews FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co., to explore the application of the efficiency
theory to a specific factual pattern.
D. Duty to Disclose
An example of the difficulty in applying the efficiency theory
to the choice of defaults arises in the reciprocal duty of con-
tracting parties to disclose information. Professor Kronman
indicates that, in respect of this duty during contract negotia-
tion, the default rule requires disclosure where the information
"has been casually acquired." '161 Although the article express-
160. Where a default is intended to be efficient by requiring certain
parties to identify themselves, in order to permit separation as to a por-
tion of the transactions, see supra note 132, the parties must be able to
accommodate alternative arrangements. For agreements not subject to
negotiation on non-financial terms, the attempt to force a separation can-
not be effective.
Professor Goetz and Dean Scott identify a software company that
provided a waiver of liability broader than necessary, because that broad-
er form had been judicially construed. Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at
272 n.24, 294-96. That discussion does not really address proper default
rules. Rather, it speaks to the importance of enforcing express agree-
ments strictly in accordance with their terms. Cf Gillette, supra note 95,
at 650-51 (arguing against an expansive interpretation of the implied
covenant of good faith, to enhance certainty in commercial contracting).
Those facts also highlight the value of a judicial rule of interpretation
where express contractual provisions override a default provided by law.
161. Kronman, supra note 121, at 33. The discussion in this Article
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ing that view has been cited with approval in both judicial
opinions and other commentary, 6 2 a few commentators have
criticized that basis for distinguishing the presence or absence
of a duty to disclose. Professor DeMott argues that this test
cannot be practicably applied.6 ' She also notes that each
party can ask the other party for all relevant information.'"
This potential access to information negates the fundamental
premise of Judge Posner's discussion in FDIC v. W.R. Grace &
Co.,165 as the costs for a party to discover basic information in
the other's possession by inquiring are substantially reduced
where the parties are represented by counsel.' 6
The circumstances of FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. include
another fact inconsistent with the premise underlying the
economic analysis relied upon by the court. Continental Illinois
had actual access to a press release that disclosed that the
field would not produce commercially viable quantities of
gas.'67 The availability of this information raises one of the
troubling issues of generality discussed above.'6 8 The absence
of a rationale for this particular level of generality increases
does not address pre-contractual opportunistic behavior by parties who
receive valuable proprietary information, such as falsely entering into a
negotiation for the purpose of obtaining proprietary information. See gen-
erally Shell, supra note 91, at 236-39 (addressing that possibility).
162. Birmingham, supra note 125, at 251. In terms of Professor
Kronman's attempt to rationalize prior cases, however, Professor Birming-
ham notes that "more cases decide for the mistaken litigant than
Kronman's article concedes." Id. at 255; cf DeMott, supra note 113, at 66
(noting inconsistent outcomes in litigation).
163. DeMott, supra note 113, at 78.
164. Id. at 92; accord Levmore, supra note 145, at 138; Wonnell, supra
note 129, at 378.
165. See W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 619 (stating that the duty to disclose
arises "when the seller has without substantial investment on his part
come upon material information which the buyer would find either im-
possible or very costly to discover himself) (emphasis added).
166. Professor Levmore discusses a possible optimal dishonesty stan-
dard, under which such questions could be answered falsely. Levmore,
supra note 145, at 139-42. Regardless of the propriety of such a rule, to
be effective, the rule would have to render unenforceable express indem-
nifications.
167. W.R. Grace, 877 F.2d at 618; see also DeMott, supra note 113, at
76.
168. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty that ultimately results in transaction costs, i.e.,
litigation.
Professor Birmingham argues that, with respect to mistake
cases, "a party cannot say what she is mistaken about."169 Of
course, one of the duties of transactional counsel is to identify
material facts and prepare appropriate representations. As
applied to the issue in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., represen-
tations concerning misstatements or omissions of facts concern-
ing loan collateral are commonly known and could be a part of
such a transaction.
Professor Kronman's selection of a default rule also has been
criticized on a theoretical level. Professor Birmingham has
questioned the absence of any limitation on the scope of infor-
mation-gathering encouraged by such a rule. 7 ° Professor
Barnett argues that permitting nondisclosure indirectly pro-
motes dissemination of information by creating incentives for
market transactions, because those transactions disclose infor-
mation through market pricing mechanisms.' He asserts,
"To be fraudulent, then, a misstatement of fact must concern
some 'intrinsic'. . . characteristic of the resource itself as op-
posed to some knowledge relevant only to the 'extrinsic' de-
mand for the resource in question."'72 He concludes, "[A] duty
to disclose should exist when the failure to disclose creates a
disparity between the rights transferred and the resources
received."'73  Professor Wonnell distinguishes between
nondisclosures that either merge or sever the possessor of infor-
169. Birmingham, supra note 125, at 282.
170. Id. at 259.
171. Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: De-
fault Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLVY 783, 797-98 (1992). Some commentators have
drawn analogies between an obligation of parties to a contract to with-
hold information and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). E.g., DeMott, supra note 113, at 86;
Levmore, supra note 145, at 144-58; Wonnell, supra note 129, at 346-51.
Professor Levmore also discusses a possible scheme of private eminent
domain, which some would find shocking. Levmore, supra note 145, at
142-44.
172. Barnett, supra note 171, at 800.
173. Id. at 802.
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mation from possession of resources.174 Professor
Coleman argues that efficiency is at issue, and supports non-
disclosure, only when the information permits an aggregate
increase in wealth.
175
Regardless of the comparative merits of the distinction
drawn by Professor Kronman, the assumption that parties can
contractually provide for an alternative allocation is integral to
his analysis.17 6 FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. represents a practi-
cal illustration of this third type of error in the application of
quantitative or quasi-quantitative analyses in legal scholar-
ship: the extension of an analysis beyond the boundaries of its
assumptions' validity.
The transaction in question was the extension of a $75 mil-
lion loan. The negotiated loan agreement consisted of twenty-
four pages (plus exhibits).17  The related mortgage consisted
of an additional thirty-three pages.17 The mortgage included
two pages of representations and warranties, one of which
stated that there were no pending suits or proceedings which,
if adversely determined, would have an adverse effect on the
collateral. 179 Continental Illinois' obligation to lend funds was
174. Wonnell, supra note 129, at 386.
175. Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default
Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 639, 695 (1989) (describing the value of such information as deriv-
ing from technology, as opposed to distribution). Others have noted the
distinction between information that permits an aggregate increase in
wealth, as opposed to a mere distributional effect. See, e.g., Birmingham,
supra note 125, at 270; Levmore, supra note 145, at 136-37.
176. See Kronman, supra note 121, at 4.
177. Loan Agreement, supra note 59.
178. Mortgage, Deed of Trust and Assignment, dated as of July 1,
1980, from The Leadership Foundation, Inc., to G.R. Waters and Henry
D. Stephens, as Trustees, and Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago (on file with author).
179. Ild. at 6-8. The precise terms of this representation are as follows:
There are no suits or proceedings pending, or to the knowledge
of the Mortgagor threatened, against or affecting the Mortgagor
or any of its properties (including the [collateral]) before any
court or by or before any regulatory authority which, if adversely
determined, would have a material adverse effect on the financial
condition or business of the Mortgagor or of the [collateral] as a
whole, and there exists no default by the Mortgagor with respect
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subject to the satisfaction of five pages of conditions,"0 and
the truth, as of that time, of two additional pages of represen-
tations."' Under those terms, Continental Illinois' obligation
to fund the loan was subject to, inter alia, there being no de-
fault under any agreement affecting the collateral.8 2
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. exemplifies the hypertechnical
framework for determining whether a default has been overrid-
den described above.8 3 Continental Illinois sought express
contractual protection from certain events that would adverse-
ly affect the collateral. By affirming a jury finding that other
representations about the collateral were made by implication,
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. does not merely set a default. The
decision requires that the parties first identify each action that
the parties took in the course of the negotiation that might be
construed as an implied representation and second expressly
state in the loan documentation that those acts were not in-
tended to constitute representations.'
Participants in commercial transactions frequently deliver to
prospective lenders or purchasers descriptive documents. A
lender may request a copy of a public company's annual report,
which the public company, in a spirit of cooperation delivers as
a convenience, in lieu of requiring the prospective lender to
pay a service to deliver a copy. Sometimes, the requested docu-
ment is prepared by a third party, such as the reserve report
in question in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. One could well argue
that the report's preparation by a third party strongly supports
the conclusion that no representation was made by the mere
delivery of a document, even in transactions incorporating
minimal documentation. On the other hand, the fact that the
to any order, writ, injunction, decree or demand of any court or
regulatory authority.
ML at 7.
180. Loan Agreement, supra note 59, at 7-8; Purchase Agreement, dat-
ed as of July 1, 1980, between Grace Petroleum Corporation and The
Leadership Foundation, Inc. 13-15 (on file with author).
181. Loan Agreement, supra note 59, at 7; Purchase Agreement, supra
note 180, at 2-4, 13.
182. Purchase Agreement, supra note 180, at 3.
183. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
184. Some courts would hold such a waiver to be unenforceable.
Palmieri, supra note 95, at 149-51.
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document was prepared in connection with the particular
transaction in question might strengthen the argument for an
implied representation.
Regardless of the merits of the argument concerning the
expectations of a majority of individuals who receive a reserve
report in a similar context, the court's conclusion cannot be
justified on the basis of efficiency. Parties to commercial trans-
actions can deliver huge quantities of diligence materials, both
through well controlled procedures and during frantic periods
of extraordinary activity involving numerous individuals with
varying degrees of authority. It is not practicable to require a
participant facilitating consummation of a transaction to ne-
gate the creation of an implied representation by requiring the
identification of each delivered document. Such a drafting
requirement would overtax the informational nexus between
lawyers and their clients.
Alternatively, one could argue that implied representations
can be terminated with language such as "the borrower repre-
sents and warrants as follows, and only as follows: [pages of
representations]." Such a requirement would unnecessarily and
inefficiently divorce a contract from its plain meaning, thereby
overly complicating an already difficult task of draftsmanship.
It is absurd to believe that parties spend hours and hours
negotiating and precisely documenting detailed representations
yet still expecting a court to find representations made beyond
the scope of the negotiated language. Moreover, such a rule
would increase the risk of inadequate legal representation,
since unscrupulous lawyers could negotiate pages of represen-
tations, and thus divert the other counsel from recognizing
implied representations.
Lawyers negotiating pages of detailed, carefully crafted
representations and conditions are forced to interpret the nego-
tiated language through the distorting lens created by FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co. Such a rule cannot be justified on the basis
of minimizing transaction costs. Further, unintended conse-
quences are likely when the parties fail to identify in contracts
all potential sources of liability.185
185. Cf Barnett, supra note 171, at 790 ("When the cost of learning
the content of and contracting around contract law is sufficiently low, by
[Vol.48:161220
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The apparent puzzle is why Continental Illinois did not
expressly condition the loan on there being, as of the date the
definitive loan documentation was executed (or as of the dates
of subsequent drawings on the facility), to the best of W.R.
Grace's knowledge, (i) no development materially and adverse-
ly affecting the value of the fields and (ii) no undisclosed ad-
verse information concerning the value of the fields. Because
W.R. Grace had such information, the urge to decide that W.R.
Grace had acted improperly, and therefore to hold that a repre-
sentation to that effect was implied as a matter of law, seems
overwhelming.
Nevertheless, there may well have been good reasons why
Continental Illinois did not bargain for this representation.
This issue involves the matters of abstraction and risk aver-
sion discussed above.186 The contours of such representations
are inherently ambiguous and are likely to cause protracted
litigation. One asked to make such a representation may there-
fore decide that the inherent uncertainty in such a representa-
tion is not warranted. These concerns may be particularly
acute with respect to, but are not limited to, property which
the borrower has not yet acquired. 87 In such a case, a lender
may decide that it has sufficient opportunity and has adequate
expertise to make its own assessment of the collateral's value.
This distinction is supported by the representations and
conditions to funding that were negotiated. In comparison to
deciding what information is material to a transaction, it often
is much easier to determine whether litigation affecting identi-
fied property is pending, whether another party has threatened
such litigation or whether there is an outstanding default un-
der contracts concerning that property.
The foregoing discussion is intended to analyze whether the
approach discussed by Professor Kronman, as applied, is justi-
fiable on the basis of efficiency. The discussion is not intended
remaining silent on a particular matter, parties can be said to have
consented to any promulgated default rule .... When, however, these
conditions do not obtain, it is no longer safe to conclude that silence
means consent to whatever background rules may happen to exist.").
186. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
187. See generally DeMott, supra note 113, at 78 (noting that a lender
has no duty to disclose to a guarantor).
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to imply that the analysis in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. is
consistent only with the concept of tort law held by extremist
proponents of law and economics. For example, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts provides:
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the trans-
action is consummated... (c) subsequently acquired informa-
tion that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previ-
ous representation that when made was true or believed to be
so; and... (e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that
the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstanc-
es, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts."
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c), (e) (1976); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a), (b), cmt. c (1979) (to the
same effect); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 474, 476
(2d ed. 1986) (to the same effect); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note
55, § 106, at 739 (stating that a duty to disclose has been found based
on a number of factors, including "[tihe manner in which the information
is acquired" and the nature of the undisclosed fact).
This discussion is not intended to provide a survey of the views
taken with respect to these disclosure obligations by all courts. An ex-
haustive collection is contained in Palmieri, supra note 95, which con-
cludes that there is such a duty arising from an obligation to deal in
good faith during contract negotiations. Id. at 151. That commentary
argues that this duty is heightened pending execution of definitive docu-
mentation where a letter of intent has been executed. Id. at 197.
Nor is the discussion in this Article intended to imply that no court
takes an alternative view to that of FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. Tri-State
Asphalt Products, Inc. v. McDonough Co., 391 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1990)
concerned the purchase of the assets of a firm, which included aggregate
that contained "hidden and concealed cores of useless fill material and
dirt." Id. at 909. The purchaser alleged fraud. The court upheld a direct-
ed verdict against the purchaser, stating, inter alia:
The trial judge found that the [seller] tried to make avail-
able . . . all information the [purchaser] wanted, and that the
[purchaser] had the opportunity to examine and test the aggre-
gate stockpiles prior to the closing date. . . . There is no evi-
dence to indicate that the [seller] did anything to prevent the
[purchaser] from inspecting the stockpiles or to intentionally
conceal the conditions of those stockpiles.
I&L at 913.
This discussion is not intended to express a view on whether the
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Quantitative or quasi-quantitative analyses may be uniquely
powerful, capable of overwhelming objections with an inevi-
table progression. The prospect of wielding such a tool may
compel commentators to elide careful scrutiny of the veracity of
requisite assumptions. FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. is not the
sole example of a theory standing on a crumbled foundation of
unwarranted assumptions. Other examples are ubiquitous.
One commentator stated, "The manager's role in trying to
make the firm's stock behave as if it were trading in an effi-
cient capital market corresponds to the role of transactional
lawyers in trying to approximate a world without transaction
costs." '89 It is not plausible that clients direct their transac-
tional counsel to prepare agreements that "approximate a
world without transaction costs," or that business lawyers
believe that to be their role. Clients want to obtain documenta-
tion that best preserves their rights, regardless of alternative
results achieved in a "perfect" environment. Any analysis
based on such assumptions is fatally flawed. Any such compel-
ling counterintuitive quantitative or quasi-quantitative discus-
sions in legal scholarship therefore demand circumspection.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this Article has reviewed attempts to re-
flect specific theories in legal scholarship. This discussion is
distinguishable from consideration of whether law is a "sci-
ence," which addresses whether there is an algorithm consti-
tuting "scientific methodology" that can be mechanically ap-
plied to assess jurisprudence.90 The focus of this Article is
rule discussed in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co. is the proper one. One may
be concerned with abstract notions such as fairness, not addressed in this
Article. Rather, the point is that the economic justification for the rule is
invalid, because the underlying assumptions are not accurate in the con-
text.
189. Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to
the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 947 n.6 (1991).
190. E.g., Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law
and the Scientific Method, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 263, 266-72 (1989) (iden-
tifying "simplicity," "explanatory power," "depth or constructivity," "fer-
tility and extensibility," "external validity," "internal consistency and log-
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more limited than those efforts to define an overarching legal
methodology. With each development in pure or applied scienc-
es that appears to have at least a tenuous application to legal
issues, it is important to reaffirm our understanding of the
benefits and limitations of importing the development into
legal scholarship."'
The three legal analyses discussed above are derived from
diverse analytical insights. In some respects, their flaws seem
diverse: deceptive reliance on metaphor, use of quantitative
terminology in framing a legal question to preordain the con-
ic" and "falsifiability" as criteria, and stating, "The 'most scientific' theory
would be the one that comports most closely with the greatest number of
these criteria."). This reference is not intended to indicate support for
such a characterization of science. Such a characterization is misleading;
it substitutes taxonomy for understanding.
191. Professor Priest expressed similar reservations:
The theoretical commitment of most "scientific" studies of the law
is weaker and more suspect, especially in studies conducted by
lawyers. Lawyers are individuals who by their investment of
many years in obtaining a legal education have demonstrated
their belief that the law and legal institutions are uniquely im-
portant in themselves, a belief hostile to any purely scientific
theory. Scientific studies of legal phenomena must be regarded
with greater skepticism than studies in the underlying sciences
themselves because the method of legal studies is most often
unscientific. Lawyers who practice social science in law schools
exploit the successes of true scientists in the underlying disci-
plines and ride free on their reputation for scientific integrity.
Before application of the scientific method by the facul-
ties of law schools can contribute to scholarship, social scientists
and lawyers interested in the social sciences must be evaluated
by their contribution to the scientific disciplines themselves, rath-
er than by the acceptance of their work by unexpert student
editors of law journals.
George L. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment
on Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284, 1293-94 (1981). That discussion
abstractly addresses the fundamental concern expressed in this Arti-
cle-that quantitative analyses in legal scholarship that lack rigor merit
scrutiny. But that discussion goes too far. Even in the sciences, there are
separate disciplines of pure and applied sciences, such as engineer-
ing-one addressing overarching theoretical concepts and the other pro-
viding recognized interstitial value, structuring the framework for under-
standing actual events in light of those theories. Each has its own value.
[Vol.48:161224
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clusion, and extension of an analysis beyond the boundaries of
its assumptions. Yet there is a common theme: each reflects an
incomplete effort to incorporate an analysis from another disci-
pline into legal scholarship. The lesson is neither that quanti-
tative and quasi-quantitative legal analyses are inevitably
erroneous, nor that substantial simplifying assumptions used
to make a legal issue receptive to quantitative analysis are
necessarily improper. Instead, the value of simplicity in an
analysis must be weighed in light of its effect on the accuracy
of the results.
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